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There are times when politicians are hostages to the lusts of their constituents.  
They dare not oppose bills that, if defeated, would serve only to aggravate those who 
placed them into office.2 Regardless of whether they actually favor the measures, the 
political risk is too great not to allow their constituents’ passions to overrun their own 
common sense.  As a consequence, laws are passed with little or no resistance.3 These 
laws can fundamentally alter the liberties and freedom of a few to satisfy the ignorant 
fear of the masses.  As a result, laws that in theory appear to protect society, in practice 
only exacerbate the perceived problem.  In situations like this, an independent judiciary 
must do what needs to be done. Because sometimes the desire of the majority overbears 
individual liberty, it is critical that the courts protect the legitimate interests of "the 
others."4 When such laws are passed and the political process is broken, it is necessary 
for the judicial branch to step forward and protect those who are politically impotent.5
When it comes to laws that involve sex offenders, the passions of the majority 
must be tempered with reason.  Overborne by a mob mentality for justice, officials at 
every level of government are enacting laws that effectively exile convicted sex offenders 
from their midst with little contemplation as to the appropriateness or constitutionality of 
their actions.  Politicians across the country will approve almost any measure that deals 
with sex offenders to appear strong on crime.6 Given that the sex offender lobby is 
neither large nor vocal, it will be up to the courts to protect the interests of this 
disenfranchised group.7
1 Elba is the island Napoleon was exiled to until his attempt to retake the French Crown to which he was 
sent to St. Helena to live in exile the remaining six years of his life.   
* Joseph L. Lester is an Associate Professor of Law at Faulkner University, Thomas Goode Jones School of 
Law, in Montgomery, Alabama.  The author would like to thank John Craft (J.D. candidate, 2007) for his 
excellent and tireless research for this article. 
2 See William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505, 529-530 
(2001). 
3 See e.g., In Georgia, 2006 H.B. 1059, which radically limited the areas that a sex offender could live and 
work passed the State Senate 52 to 1.  Available at 
<<http://www.legis.state.ga.us/legis/2005_06/sum/hb1059.htm>>; John Curran (Associated Press), Sex-
offender Zones Assailed, PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER Aug. 22, 2005, (The town of Brick, New Jersey, 
included school bus stops in its list of locations an offender is prohibited from living 2,500 feet from. With 
more than 2,000 bus stops, the measure effectively bars offenders from living anywhere in the town. “It’s 
pretty tough, if someone introduces an ordinance like this, to vote no,” said Brick Mayor Joseph Scarpelli. 
“I know they’ll probably have a case that tests all these ordinances, and there’s a good possibility a lot will 
be thrown out as unconstitutional. But it makes a town feel that they care about their children.”) 
4 See <<http://www.postcolonialweb.org/poldiscourse/themes/other.html>> 
5 See Wayne A. Logan, "Democratic Despotism" and Constitutional Constraint: An Empirical Analysis of 
Ex Post Facto Claims in State Courts, 12 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 439, 495-496 (2004). 
6 Lee Rood, New Data Shows Twice as Many Sex Offenders Missing, DES MOINES REGISTER AND TRIBUNE,
Jan. 22, 2006. Quoting state Sen. Dick Deardon, Dem. “it will be difficult to change. ‘No one wants a 
postcard to come out two weeks before the election saying they are lax on sex offenders.'" Id.
7 Relying on politicians to act against their constituents' wishes to benefit an unpopular minority is wishful 
thinking. "There is little legislative hay to be made in cultivating the multiple murderer vote."  Cal. Dep't of 
Corr. v. Morales, 514 U.S. 499, 522 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting).  See also Todd Dorman, Prosecutors: 
Dump Offender Rule, QUAD-CITY TIMES, Jan. 24, 2006. (Prosecutors ask the court to do what the 
2This article does not dispute the idea that sex offenders should be dealt with 
harshly.  But there has to be a time when enough is enough.  The law should provide 
some opportunity for repentance.8 Individuals make mistakes, but they should be 
allowed an opportunity to change.  Individuals like Lori Sue Collins, who after serving 
three years for having sex with a teenage boy, found God. Upon her release, she worked 
as the residence director at the Door of Hope, a halfway house for sex offenders.9 She 
believed her calling was to help others like her turn away from the sins of their past and 
live as productive members of society.  But because the Door of Hope is located within 
1,000 feet of a school bus stop, Lori had to quit her job and move because of residence 
and employment restrictions.10 
This article will look at why sex offenders are treated differently than other 
criminal offenders. Sex offenders are subject to sanctions and prohibitions above and 
beyond what other criminal offenders must face.  Next, the article will look at some of 
the residence and employment restrictions placed on sex offenders to determine if they 
are rationally related to any legitimate government interest without overbearing the sex 
offender’s constitutional rights.  Finally, the article will offer an alternate means of sex 
offense prevention that encourages sex offender assimilation back into society instead of 
further exclusion. 
This article will focus on those individuals who have been classified as sex 
offenders and who have successfully completed their sentence, however long it may have 
been.  This article does not deal with laws aimed at restricting the freedom of individuals 
released on probation or parole.  Any type of supervised release is a contractual 
agreement between the individual and the state and any rights an individual wishes to 
waive to have some limited degree of freedom are within the individual's discretion and 
the state's prerogative to require.  There is no such bargain for those who have completed 
their sentence.  Society has an obligation to those who have paid their debt for the wrong 
committed to accept a convict’s repentance.11 There should be at least some opportunity 
for that individual to assimilate back into society.  However, the residence and 
employment laws currently promulgated by twenty-four states and many other local 
communities around the country serve only to exile those who desire a second chance at 
 
legislature cannot -- remove this law).  See also Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) (standing for the 
proposition that the political process should be balance and fair to everyone providing "one person, one 
vote"). 
8 See e.g. State v. Chaney, 477 P.2d 441 (Alaska, 1970) "The primary goal of such legislation is an attempt 
to implement Alaska's constitutional mandate that penal administration shall be based on the principle of 
reformation and upon the need for protecting the public"; ALA CODE §13A-1-3(5) The purpose of the 
criminal code is "To insure the public safety by . . . the rehabilitation of those convicted."  ALA CODE 
§13A-1-3(6) "To prevent the arbitrary or oppressive treatment of persons accused or convicted of 
offenses." 
9 Whitaker et al., v. Purdue, et al., United States District Court, Northern District of Georgia, Complaint 
filed June 20, 2006, pg 16-18. 
<<http://www.schr.org/aboutthecenter/pressreleases/HB1059_litigation/LegalDocuments/HB1059_Compla
int.pdf>> 
10 Id.
11 Provided that the offender has served his/her time and actually seeks to turn away from his/her previous 
deviant behavior. 
3life.12 Instead of protecting society, these laws actually push individuals into antisocial 
behavior and likely back into trouble with the law.  But besides simply being bad public 
policy, these laws are contrary to the ordered scheme of liberty that we hold so dear. As 
Justice McKenna so eloquently put it almost 100 years ago: 
His prison bars and chains are removed, it is true, after twelve years, but 
he goes from them to a perpetual limitation of his liberty. He is forever 
kept under the shadow of his crime forever kept within voice and view of 
the criminal magistrate, not being able to change his domicile without 
giving notice to the "authority immediately in charge of his surveillance," 
and without permission in writing. He may not seek, even in other scenes 
and among other people, to retrieve his fall from rectitude. Even that hope 
is taken from him and he is subject to tormenting regulations that, if not so 
tangible as iron bars and stonewalls, oppress as much by their continuity, 
and deprive of essential liberty.13 
I. Who is a sex offender? 
 A lawbreaker is a sex offender if he or she is guilty of one of the many 
enumerated crimes that constitute a sex offense.  The definition of what is a sex offense is 
set forth by statute and varies from state to state.  In some states the list is short, while in 
others the list is extensive.  The status of being a sex offender may not be limited to 
individuals with felony convictions.  Even a class A misdemeanor conviction can result 
in being labeled a sex offender.14 For most states there is a three prong designation for 
 
12 There 19 states with residence restrictions, not a condition of probation/parole/supervision, in order of 
enactment or latest amendments. Delaware (July 25, 1995) (OD); Alabama (Sept. 1, 1999) (OD); Illinois 
(July 7, 2000) (OD, SVP); Louisiana (June 28, 2001) (SVP); Iowa (July 1, 2002) (OD); Arkansas (July 16, 
2003) (RD+SVP); Ohio (July 31, 2003) (OD); Oklahoma (Nov. 1, 2003) (RD); Tennessee (June 8, 2004) 
(RD); Missouri (June 14, 2004) (OD); Florida (Oct. 1, 2004) (OD); Michigan (Jan. 1, 2006) (RD); Georgia 
(July 1, 2006) (RD); Idaho (July 1, 2006) (RD); Indiana (July 1, 2006) (RD); Mississippi (July 1, 2006) 
(RD); South Dakota (July 1, 2006) (RD); Virginia (July 1, 2006) (OD); Kentucky (July 12, 2006) (RD). 
The term in parentheses indicates whether the classification is Offense Driven (OD), Registration Driven 
(RD), or applies to Sexually Violent Predators (SVP). See infra Table 1 for citations.  8 states have a 
residence restriction as a condition of probation/parole/supervision: Arizona, ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-
1604.07(F) (LexisNexis 2006); California, CAL. PENAL CODE § 3003(g) (West 2006); Florida, FLA. STAT. §
947.1405(7)(a)(2) (2006); FLA. STAT. § 948.30(1)(b) (2006);  Indiana, IND. CODE ANN. § 11-13-3-
4(g)(2)(B) (West 2006), IND. CODE ANN. § 35-38-2-2.2(2) (West 2006);  Louisiana, LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
15:538(D)(1)(c) (West 2006); Oregon, OR. REV. STAT. § 144.642(1)(a) (2006); Texas, TEX. CODE CRIM.
PROC. ANN. art. 42.12(13B) (Vernon 2006); West Virginia, W. VA. CODE § 62-12-26(b)(1) (2006). 
13 Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 366 (1910) 
14 For example, In Illinois, where the residence restrictions is offense driven, one of the offenses is 
"indecent solicitation of an adult."  720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-9.3(c)(2.5).  A person who arranges for a 
person 17 years of age or over to commit an act of sexual conduct with a person 13 or older but under 17 
commits a Class A misdemeanor.  720 ILL. COMP. STAT 5/11-6.5.  In Michigan, a second or subsequent 
conviction for indecent exposure subjects you to the residence restriction.  MICH COMP. LAWS 
28.722(e)(iii).  Indecent exposure is a misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment up to 2 years, or a fine up 
to $2,000, or both. MICH. COMP. LAWS 750.335a(2)(b).  In Missouri, furnishing pornographic material to 
minors subjects you to the residence restriction.  MO. CODE. ANN. 566.147(1).  Furnishing pornographic 
material to minors is a Class A misdemeanor.  MO. CODE ANN. 573.040(2).  Indecent exposure subjects 
you to the residence restriction in Oklahoma.  OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 57, § 582(A). Although the crime is 
categorized as a felony, the punishment ranges from a fine of $500 to $20,000, imprisonment from 30 days 
to 10 years, or both.  OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1021(A).  So, you could plead guilty, pay a $500 fine, and 
be forced out of your home. 
4sex offender registration which subjects them to the residence and employment 
restrictions.  A sex offender typically is a person convicted of a sexually violent offense, 
deemed a sexually violent predator, or convicted of a criminal offense against a victim 
who is a minor.15 
The interesting aspect about this classification scheme as it relates to residence 
and employment restrictions is that for two of the three categories it does not matter 
whether the victim of the underlying crime is a child.  So a person who is convicted of 
sex abuse against another adult is prohibited from living or working where children 
congregate as if he or she were a child molester.  Focusing on the child victim is not clear 
enough either.  Some states limit the status of "sex offender" to "child sex offender" in 
which case only crimes where the victim is a minor are considered.16 Crimes against 
adults are not used in that particular classification.17 For this classification, it does not 
matter if there is any sexual intent involved -- only that the victim of the crime is a child.  
For these restrictions to be rationally related to the interests of protecting children from 
sexual criminals, then the crimes which classify convicts as sex offenders should at a 
minimum include a sexual act and a child.18 
Many people may think of sex offenders as "dirty old men prowling the streets," 
but with the wide spectrum of offenses that automatically lead to being classified as a sex 
offender, many times sex offenders are decent people who made a mistake.19 Take 
Wendy Whitaker, for example.  At 17, she had consensual sexual relations with a 15-
year-old boy.20 Now 26, and without any other mark on her criminal record, she is a sex 
offender who is captured under Georgia's sex offender restrictions.  Or Jay Hikes, who at 
the age of 19 had consensual sex with a 15-year-old girl in New Jersey.21 Now 36, 
married and with a small child, he too will be caught up in the broad net of sex offender 
residence and employment restrictions. Silly mistakes and actions that many people other 
 
15 See et al GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-12 (effective July 1, 2006); IOWA CODE ANN. § 692A.1 (West 2006). 
16 See e.g. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/11-9.3(c)(1), 5/11-9.3(c)(2.5) (A “child sex offender” is a person who, 
Has been charged with a sex offense or the attempt to commit an included sex offense, and (a) Is convicted, 
(b)Is found not guilty by reason of insanity, or (c) Is the subject of a finding not resulting in an acquittal at a 
hearing; or (d) Is certified as a sexually dangerous person, when any conduct giving rise to such 
certification is committed or attempted against a person less than 18 years of age.) 
17 See e.g. 720 Ill. Comp. Stat. Sex offense means, 5/11-9.3(c)(2.5) 
Child luring. Aiding and abetting child abduction. Indecent solicitation of a child.  Indecent solicitation of 
an adult.  Soliciting for a juvenile prostitution. Keeping a place of juvenile prostitution. Patronizing a 
juvenile prostitute.  Juvenile pimping. Exploitation of a child.  Child pornography.  Predatory criminal 
sexual assault of a child.  Ritualized abuse of a child.  Criminal sexual assault (when victim under 18 years 
of age).  Aggravated criminal sexual assault (when victim under 18 years of age). Aggravated criminal 
sexual abuse (when victim under 18 years of age).  Criminal sexual abuse (when victim under 18 years of 
age).  Kidnapping (when victim under 18 years of age and defendant not parent).  Aggravated kidnapping 
(when victim under 18 years of age and defendant not parent).  Unlawful restraint (when victim under 18 
years of age and defendant not parent). Aggravated unlawful restraint (when victim under 18 years of age 
and defendant not parent).  An attempt to commit any of the aforementioned offenses. 
18 See Raines v. State, 805 So.2d 999 (Fla. App. 4th. 2001) (holding that inclusion of defendant in 
definition of "sexual offender," without concomitant sexual component, rendered sexual offender 
registration statute overinclusive in violation of equal protection). 
19 Jenny Jarvie. Suit Target's Georgia Sex Offender Law. L.A. TIMES, July 2, 2006. 
20 Jenny Jarvie. Suit Target's Georgia Sex Offender Law. L.A. TIMES, July 2, 2006. 
21 Doug Nurse. Many Feel Impact of New Sex Offender Law. ATLANTA JOURNAL CONSTITUTION, July 6, 
2006. 
5would not have had qualms about doing could earn individual the sex offender label.22 
So, it is not just those who commit rape, incest and sex abuse who are branded a sex 
offender.  There is a significant probability that individuals with little potential to re-
offend are treated the same as those who actually are predators.23 
In the handful of states where there are sex offender employment and residence 
restrictions, sex offender status can be earned automatically with a conviction of a 
particular crime.  In Alabama, for example, a conviction, even a nolo contendere plea, of 
the following will result in sex offender classification: Rape in the first or second degree; 
sodomy in the first of second degree; sexual torture; sex abuse in the first or second 
degree; enticing a child to enter a vehicle, room, house, office, or other place for immoral 
purposes; promoting prostitution in the first or second degree; violation of the Alabama 
Child Pornography Act; kidnapping of a minor, except by a parent, in the first or second 
degree; incest, when the offender is an adult and the victim is a minor; soliciting a child 
by computer for the purposes of committing a sexual act and transmitting obscene 
material to a child by computer; any solicitation, attempt, or conspiracy to commit any of 
the aforementioned offenses24 and a conviction for any criminal sex offense when the 
victim was under the age of 12 and any offense involving child pornography.25 
Sex offender status is painted with a broad brush, marking more individuals than 
necessary. The label is one that should be avoided at all costs.  As a result statutes that 
require automatic inclusion by those convicted of particular crimes will likely make 
convictions for those crimes more difficult to come by.  As the time frame for potential 
punishment is extended, many individuals accused of such crimes will not be willing to 
accept a guilty plea regardless of the suggested punishment.26 The status of being a sex 
offender is a long-term, even a lifetime, marking.  Such a stigma should be very narrowly 
applied, if at all. 
II. Why all the fuss over this crime? 
Sex offenders are a special cast of criminals that excite the general public more 
than other run-of-the-mill criminals.27 The combination of sex and violence makes for a 
 
22 A sex offender could just be a person who committed a mischievous act such as mooning or streaking. 
See generally, Kaffie Sledge. Labels May Mislead, COLUMBUS LEDGER-ENQUIRER, June 29, 2006. "For 
instance, if reported, relieving oneself outdoors (behind a tree on the golf course or behind a building) 
could result in being charged with a sex offense. It's a misdemeanor if the witness is an adult; a felony if 
witnessed by a minor." Id.
23 Sometimes innocent fun can be criminal. KUTV, 8-Year-Old Charged For Sexual Conduct With Sitter, 
July 28, 2005, Salt Lake City, Utah. (A 14-year-old female baby-sitter "dared" the 8-year-old boy, in a 
game of truth-or-dare, to touch her breasts, which he did.  When he told his mother about it, she called the 
police and both the 8-year-old boy and the 14-year-old baby-sitter where charged with lewdness with a 
minor.  The charges were later dropped.)  Available at 
http://kutv.com/topstories/local_story_210004013.html 
24 ALA. CODE § 15-20-21(4). 
25 ALA. CODE § 15-20-21(5). 
26 Even an offer of probated sentence might be rejected as a matter of course if the sex offender label must 
attach.  The less plea bargains the more trials.  One might speculate that within a brief period of time the 
bulk of the criminal cases tried will be sex offenses.   
27 See Joseph E. Kennedy, Monstrous Offenders and the Search for Solidarity Through Modern 
Punishment, 51 HASTINGS L. J. 829, 881-82 (2000) "Stories about crime involving children in particular tap 
into a complex of concerns about modern life. Indeed, it is noteworthy that so many of the moral panics of 
the nineties involved children in either a victim or an offender role (or in the case of drug use, both victim 
and offender)." Id.
6story line that sells.28 Readers and viewers are titillated by these often NC-17 rated 
stories.  Throw a story line that includes children into the mix with sex and violence and 
you have a potential to create a lynch mob.  Stories of just a few abused children can 
unite the public to demand change.29 Media attention can blow a situation out of 
 
28 Popular television shows such as Law & Order: Special Victims Unit or Dateline NBC use sex stories to 
capture and audience.  
29 See Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-248 (July 27, 2006). 
 
SEC. 2. IN RECOGNITION OF JOHN AND REVÉ WALSH ON THE OCCASION OF THE 
25TH ANNIVERSARY OF ADAM WALSH'S ABDUCTION AND MURDER. 
 
(a) ADAM WALSH'S ABDUCTION AND MURDER.--On July 27, 1981, in Hollywood, Florida, 
6-year-old Adam Walsh was abducted at a mall. Two weeks later, some of Adam's remains were 
discovered in a canal more than 100 miles from his home. 
 
SEC. 102. DECLARATION OF PURPOSE. 
 
In order to protect the public from sex offenders and offenders against children, and in response to 
the vicious attacks by violent predators against the victims listed below, Congress in this Act 
establishes a comprehensive national system for the registration of those offenders: 
(1) Jacob Wetterling, who was 11 years old, was abducted in 1989 in Minnesota, and remains 
missing. 
(2) Megan Nicole Kanka, who was 7 years old, was abducted, sexually assaulted, and murdered in 
1994, in New Jersey. 
(3) Pam Lychner, who was 31 years old, was attacked by a career offender in Houston, Texas. 
(4) Jetseta Gage, who was 10 years old, was kidnapped, sexually assaulted, and murdered in 2005, 
in Cedar Rapids, Iowa. 
(5) Dru Sjodin, who was 22 years old, was sexually assaulted and murdered in 2003, in North 
Dakota. 
(6) Jessica Lunsford, who was 9 years old, was abducted, sexually assaulted, buried alive, and 
murdered in 2005, in Homosassa, Florida. 
(7) Sarah Lunde, who was 13 years old, was strangled and murdered in 2005, in Ruskin, Florida. 
(8) Amie Zyla, who was 8 years old, was sexually assaulted in 1996 by a juvenile offender in 
Waukesha, Wisconsin, and has become an advocate for child victims and protection of children 
from juvenile sex offenders. 
(9) Christy Ann Fornoff, who was 13 years old, was abducted, sexually assaulted, and murdered in 
1984, in Tempe, Arizona. 
(10) Alexandra Nicole Zapp, who was 30 years old, was brutally attacked and murdered in a 
public restroom by a repeat sex offender in 2002, in Bridgewater, Massachusetts. 
(11) Polly Klaas, who was 12 years old, was abducted, sexually assaulted, and murdered in 1993 
by a career offender in California. 
(12) Jimmy Ryce, who was 9 years old, was kidnapped and murdered in Florida on September 11, 
1995. 
(13) Carlie Brucia, who was 11 years old, was abducted and murdered in Florida in February, 
2004. 
(14) Amanda Brown, who was 7 years old, was abducted and murdered in Florida in 1998. 
(15) Elizabeth Smart, who was 14 years old, was abducted in Salt Lake City, Utah in June 2002. 
(16) Molly Bish, who was 16 years old, was abducted in 2000 while working as a lifeguard in 
Warren, Massachusetts, where her remains were found 3 years later. 
(17) Samantha Runnion, who was 5 years old, was abducted, sexually assaulted, and murdered in 
California on July 15, 2002. 
 
7proportion so that it appears that isolated events are really an epidemic.30 The laws often 
reflect the plight of the particular child who precipitated the law by carrying their names, 
such as Kyle, Megan or Jessica.31 
Crimes involving sex, especially when the victim is a child, are perceived as more 
heinous crimes because the degree of violation of our personal privacy and innocence.  
Victims of sex crimes rarely just walk away from the incident without some physical or 
emotional scarring.  In fact, nearly one-third of all rape victims, regardless of age, suffer 
some sort of post-traumatic stress disorder.32 
Anger is easily stirred against those who commit sex crimes.  Sex offenders are 
not even honored among thieves.33 It is not uncommon for prisoners to execute jailhouse 
justice to those who commit sex crimes, especially if it involved a minor.34 Up until June 
2006, in Illinois, the sex offender classification included those who murder children.  A 
child-murderer asked for and received a new separate classification because he did not 
 
30 For example, anytime there is a shark attack news coverage of such an event gives people a false 
perception that shark attacks are common.  
<<http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2004/01/0123_040123_tvgreatwhiteshark.html>>. When in 
reality the likelihood of being attacked by a shark is extremely rare. From 1670-2001 there were only 2,110 
reported shark attacks worldwide. <<http://www.sharkattackphotos.com/Images/Misc/attackmap.jpg>> ; 
See also Sharp, CT (Letter to the Editor) C'mon, ST. LOUIS JOURNALISM REVIEW, Dec. 1, 2003, Vol. 34, 
Issue 262 "In November, KSDK (Channel 5) promoted a story about sex offenders living near school bus 
stops as if it had discovered a plague epidemic in St. Louis.  I know that November is sweeps month, but 
this promo was ridiculous. . . It has to be at the top of the list of sensationalistic non-stories fabricated by 
Channel 5." 
31 See Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children and Sexually Violent Offender Registration Act, Pub. L. 
No. 103-322, Title XVII, § 170101 (Sept. 13, 1994). Key Developments in Jacob Wetterling 
Disappearance, MINNEAPOLIS-ST. PAUL STAR TRIBUNE (August 2, 2006) (available at 
http://www.startribune.com/462/story/592010.html); Megan’s Law, Pub. L. No. 104-145 (May 17, 1996). 
Named after Megan Nicole Kanka. Steinhamilton, L., Megan’s Law Interests Britain, NEWARK STAR 
LEDGER (July 23, 2006) (available at http://www.nj.com/news/ledger/jersey/index.ssf?/base/news-
4/115362967774340.xml&coll=1); Pam Lychner Sexual Offender Tracking and Identification Act of 1996, 
Pub. L. No. 104-236 (Oct. 3, 1996);  Jimmy Ryce Involuntary Civil Commitment for Sexually Violent 
Predators' Treatment and Care Act, Fla. HB 3327, ch. 98-64 (May 19, 1998). Hancock, D., Kidnappers Are 
Seldom Strangers, CBS News (June 19, 2002) (available at 
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2002/06/19/national/main512745.shtml);  Jessica Lunsford Act, Fla. HB 1877, ch. 
2005-28 (May 2, 2005). Fineout, G. & Klas, M., Dead Kids are Campaign Fodder for Crist, MIAMI 
HERALD (Aug. 3, 2006) (available at http://www.miami.com/mld/miamiherald/news/15184792.htm)  Adam 
Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-248 (July 27, 2006). Santiago, R. & 
Demarzo, W., New Law Marks Adam Walsh Case Anniversary, MIAMI HERALD (July 27, 2006) (available 
at http://www.miami.com/mld/miamiherald/news/15184792.htm). 
32 NATIONAL CENTER FOR VICTIMS OF CRIME. Rape-Related Posttraumatic Stress Disorder. 
<<http://www.ncvc.org/ncvc/main.aspx?dbName=DocumentViewer&DocumentAction=ViewProperties&
DocumentID=32366&UrlToReturn=http%3a%2f%2fwww.ncvc.org%2fncvc%2fmain.aspx%3fdbName%3
dAdvancedSearch>> 
33 Sex offenders, especially child sex offenders, are treated poorly in prison.  Among prisoners sex 
offenders are considered the lowest prisoners of all. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, No Escape: Male Rape in 
U.S. Prisons. <<http://www.hrw.org/reports/2001/prison/report4.html#N_222_>> 
34 See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, No Escape: Male Rape in U.S. Prisons. 
<<http://www.hrw.org/reports/2001/prison/report4.html#N_222_>> Explaining the targeting of prisoners 
convicted of sexually abusing minors, another inmate said: Inmates confined for sexual offenses, especially 
those against juvenile victims, are at the bottom of the pecking order and consequentially most often 
victimized. Because of their crime, the general population justifies using their weakness by labeling rape 
"just punishment" for their crime. Sexual offenders are the number one target group for prisoner rape. Id.
8want to be labeled as a sex offender because of the stigma.35 When abusing a child is 
considered worse than murdering a child, there is little doubt the term "sex offender" 
brands a deep mark. 
Finally, there is a dangerousness myth that surrounds sex offenders.36 Studies in 
the 1970s and 1980s that suggested sex offender recidivism was not affected by treatment 
led many to the conclusion that there was nothing that could be done to curb the deviant 
behavior.37 Couple the misuse of research data with a media that sensationalizes sex 
crimes and sex offenders, and it is no wonder the public sentiment against sex offenders 
is so high.38 
III. Comparative recidivism rates 
 Contrary to popular public opinion, the recidivism rate for sex crimes is no worse 
than the recidivism rate for other crimes.39 In fact, sex offense recidivism is extremely 
low compared to the recidivism for other crimes.40 According to the Department of 
Justice’s statistics of sex offender recidivism, 5.3 percent of sex offenders were rearrested 
for a sex offense within three years of their release.41 Forty-three percent of convicted 
sex offenders were arrested for all crimes during this same period, but the overwhelming 
majority of those arrests were for other non-sexual allegations.42 Also, using arrests as 
proof of behavior is misleading because those with a criminal record are often the first 
ones blamed for new criminal activity. 
While a 24 percent recidivism rate might sound high, using it as a call to arms 
when most other crimes have a similar propensity or worse is fallacious.  For example, 67 
percent of drug convicts are rearrested within three years with a conviction rate of 47 
 
35 Jocelyn Black, Illinois House and Senate Agree to Send ‘Sex Offender Only’ Bill, MEDILL NEWS 
SERVICE, http://mesh.medill.northwestern.edu/mnschicago/archives/2006/04/sexoffdb_the_il.html (April 6, 
2006).  On June 27, 2006, the governor signed into law the Child Murderer and Violent Offender Against 
Youth Registration Act. The Act provides for the registration of persons who were previously registered as 
sex offenders under the Sex Offender Registration Act for the offenses of kidnapping, aggravated 
kidnapping, unlawful restraint, aggravated unlawful restraint, first degree murder, child abduction, and 
forcible detention when those offenses were committed against persons under 18 years of age. See HB 
4193, Public Act 94-0945.  State rep. John Fritchey (D-Chicago) introduced the bill in November 2005. He 
said that he was inspired, by a woman, whose son would have to register as a sex offender, even though his 
murder conviction didn't have anything to do with a sexual crime. "As a father, I know firsthand how 
terrifying the words 'sex offender' are to a parent and I have zero tolerance for those individuals," Rep. 
Fritchey said in a press release. "But we're essentially talking about truth in labeling here. We were 
attaching a very powerful and inaccurate stigma to someone whose transgression did not warrant it. He was 
essentially facing a second sentence for a crime he did not commit." Id. 
36 See <<http://www.atsa.com/ppOffenderFacts.html>> 
37 Id. 
38 See Nora V. Demleitner, First Peoples, First Principles: The Sentencing Commission's Obligation to 
Reject False Images of Criminal Offenders. 87 IOWA L. REV. 563, 569 (2002). 
39 See Iowa Dep't of Human Rights Div. of Criminal and Juvenile Justice Planning and Statistical Analysis 
Center. Iowa Sex Offender Registry and Recidivism (Dec. 2000); Bureau of Justice Statistics. Recidivism of 
Sex Offenders Released from Prison in 1994, NCJ 198281, at 14, (Nov. 2003), available at 
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/rsorp94.pdf. "The 43% re-arrest rate of the 9,691 released sex 
offenders was low by comparison." Id.
40 See Bureau of Justice Statistics. Recidivism of Sex Offenders Released from Prison in 1994, NCJ 198281, 
(Nov. 2003), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/rsorp94.pdf. 
41 Id. at 2.   
42 Id. at 14. 
9percent,43 yet there is no restriction keeping drug offenders from living or working near 
schools.  While most states have laws that enhance a drug crime if it takes place within a 
certain distance from a school, there is nothing to prevent drug offenders from living 
there after they are released.44 Thus, sex offender employment and residence restrictions 
are either precursors of what is to come to all criminal offenders or a special sanction for 
only the sex offender. 
Data can be used to mislead.  As often stated there are “lies, damn lies – and 
statistics.”45 The data collected for sex offender recidivism could fit into all three 
categories.  The Department of Justice is guilty of misleading the public with non-
informative information.  In its introduction and highlights section the report lists that 
"sex offenders are four times more likely to be arrested for of a new sex crime than non-
sex offenders."46 Statistics make this true because only 1.3 percent of the non-sex 
offenders committed sex crimes.47 Looking at the raw numbers, the actual incidences of 
sexual recidivism is much greater for the non-sex offenders than the sex offenders.48 So, 
with all the focus on the convicted sex offenders we miss approximately 86.5 percent of 
the new sex crimes.49 
IV. Restrictions 
 With the belief that proximity leads to promiscuity, twenty-four states currently 
have some form of residence and/or employment restrictions for convicted sex offenders 
with other states, such as California looking to join the fray.50 These restrictions may last 
for only the designated period of supervised release or apply for the remainder of an 
offender's life.51 Nineteen states have residence and/or employment restrictions that 
apply beyond the period of any probation or parole period.52 In some states these 
restrictions are permanent with no process or ability to remove the burden.53 These 
restrictions have disastrous effects on convicted sex offenders who are trying to be decent 
 
43 Bureau of Justice Statistics, Recidivism of Prisoners Released in 1994 at 11, (2002) available at 
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/rpr94.pdf. 
44 See e g. 18 Pa. C.S.A. §6314 (b) (3-4). "In addition to the mandatory minimum sentence set forth in 
subsection (a), the person shall be sentenced to an additional minimum sentence of at least two years total 
confinement, notwithstanding any other provision of this title or other statute to the contrary, if the person 
did any of the following: . . . 3) Committed the offense within 1,000 feet of the real property on which is 
located a public, private or parochial school or a college or university. (4) Committed the offense on a 
school bus or within 500 feet of a school bus stop." I.d.
45 A quote from Mark Twain’s Autobiography (1924). Twain gives credit for the quote to Disraeli.  See << 
http://www1c.btwebworld.com/quote-unquote/p0000149.htm>>. 
46 Bureau of Justice Statistics, Recidivism of Sex Offenders Released From Prison in 1994, NCJ 198281, at 
1, (Nov. 2003), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/abstract/rsorp94.htm. 
47 Id.5.3 percent is four times more than 1.3 percent, but neither is very high.
48 Id. 517 of 9,691 sex offenders were rearrested for a new sex crime within three years compared to 3,328 
out of 262,420 non-sex offenders. Id. 
49 Id. Of the 3845 new sex crime arrests, 3,328 were from non-sex offenders. Id.
50 See footnote 11; See also California Ballot Initiative Proposition 83 on the fall 2006 ballot.   
51 See e.g. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-8310(1). (setting the restrictive period at 10 years) see also ALA. CODE § 15-20-
33(a) (setting the restrictive period at life). 
52 See infra note 11. 
53 For example, Iowa has no means for a sex offender subject to residence and employment restrictions to 
ever have those restrictions lifted.  Doe v. Miller, 405 F.3d 700, 709 (8th Cir. 2005) (finding that "there is 
no requirement that the State provide a process to establish an exemption from a legislative classification.") 
citing Conn. Dep't of Pub. Safety v. Doe, 538 U.S. 1, 7-8 (2003).  
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members of the community. Often they are forced to quit their jobs and move.54 By 
having these restrictions a state's public policy demonstrates a preference for sex 
offenders to be unemployed and living in an "RV in old K-Mart parking lot" or in a 
"truck near the river" or "under the 7th street bridge."55 With these laws, sex offenders 
are forced to live nomadic lives. 
 It is not uncommon to have laws that prevent activities from taking place within a 
certain distance of a school, church or residential area.56 What is unique about these 
restrictions is the lack of any criminal desire required.  These zoning restrictions do not 
involve a crime, as in the case with selling or possessing drugs or guns near schools.57 In 
this case, the mere physical presence of a former sex offender is the offense.  The thrust 
of the injustice in these laws is against those who have completed their sentence and are 
not released as parolees or probationers.  It is these individuals who are ready to start 
their lives over; but with these residence and employment restrictions hanging over their 
heads, they will have a difficult time assimilating.   
Residence 
Nineteen states58 and many other local communities have enacted residence 
restrictions on former sex offenders, prohibiting them from living a certain distance away 
from schools,59 child-care facilities,60 public swimming pools,61 public playgrounds,62 
churches or any area where minors congregate, such as parks, arcades and even school 
bus stops.63 Restrictions from living 500, 1,000, 1,500 or 2,000 feet from the above 
mentioned areas seems like a quick and simple fix to the perceived recidivism problem.  
However, this final solution actually solves nothing while presenting a host of new 
problems, the least of which is a violation of the individual's constitutional rights. 
The residence restrictions are typically from property line to property line and not 
door-to-door, so the prohibited area is often larger than one might expect.64 Communities 
that have restrictions of 2,000 feet essentially block out all of the urban areas as the 
 
54 Jill S. Levenson & Leo P. Cotter, The Impact of  Sex Offender Residence Restrictions: 1,000 Feet From 
Danger or One Step From Absurd? 49 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF OFFENDER THERAPY AND 
COMPARATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 168 (2005). 
55 These are actual responses by individuals forced to move and list their new address with their sex 
offender treatment providers in Iowa.  See 
<<http://www.dc.state.ks.us/SOHR/Twenty_Findings_on_Restrictions_for_Sex_Offenders.htm>> 
56 See e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 790.115(1)(Exhibiting a firearm or weapon within a 1,000 feet of a school); 
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 790.115(2)(b)(Possessing an electric weapon or device, destructive device, or other 
weapon on school property); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 790.115(2)(c)(Possessing firearm on school property). 
57 See e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. 2C:11-5 (Death by vehicular manslaughter is worse if the perpetrator was 
intoxicated and the victim was on school grounds) 
58 See infra table 1. 
59 See e.g., ALA. CODE § 15-20-26(a). 
60 Id. 
61 See e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:91.1(A)(2) (West 2006) (effective June 28, 2001). 
62 See e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17.495(1) (West 2006) (effective July 12, 2006). 
63 See e.g. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 947.1405(7)(a)(2).  See also infra table 1. 
64 See e.g. In Georgia, the distance is measured from the property boundary of the sex offender’s residence 
to the property boundary of the child care facility, school, or area where minors congregate, at their closest 
points. GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-13(b). But in Kentucky, the measurement shall be taken in a straight line from 
the nearest wall of the school to the nearest wall of the registrant’s place of residence. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §
17.495. 
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overlapping bubbles leave few if any reasonable places to reside.65 A quick look at an 
urban area map will demonstrate how such restrictions severely limit housing options for 
sex offenders.66 The purpose it seems is to drive sex offenders out of the community.  
Some legislators are even so brazen as to admit such intent.67 Whether banishment is the 
purpose, it is the result.   
Among the states that have residence restrictions, there is some discrepancy in 
determining which sex offenders qualify for residence restrictions.  In Arkansas, Georgia, 
Indiana, Kentucky, Michigan, Oklahoma, South Dakota and Tennessee, the residence 
restrictions are registration driven. In other words, all individuals who have to register as 
sex offenders are subject to residence restrictions.68 In Alabama, Illinois, Iowa, Missouri, 
and Ohio, the residence restrictions are offense driven, so the application is not as facially 
broad, but is still significant.69 In Louisiana, the residence restrictions apply only to those 
classified as sexually violent predators.  Arizona, California, Florida, Oregon, and Texas 
only have residence restrictions as part of probation or parole or some other form of 
supervised release.70 Indiana has enacted a more broadly applicable restriction, but the 
previous law regarding parolees remains in effect.71 
Washington and Nebraska are unique in that there is no overarching state mandate 
for residence and employment restrictions with the actually decision on restrictions left 
up to the local communities.  The state does provide some guidance and limitations as to 
how far the communities can go. Washington imposed a residence restriction on sex 
offenders as a condition of community custody.72 The offender could not reside within 
880 feet from the facilities or grounds of a public or private school.73 In 2006, 
Washington established a committee to develop statewide standards for cities and towns 
to use when determining whether to impose residency restrictions on sex offenders.74 
Nebraska defers to and provides guidance for local communities that enact residency 
restrictions. State legislation signed into law on April 13, 2006, allows cities to prohibit a 
 
65 By reasonable I mean an affordable, safe living space.  It is not reasonable to say that an individual has a 
theoretical option to move to a certain neighborhood when the cost of living space far outlays the 
individual’s financial means.  Likewise, it is not reasonable to force people to move into a “high crime 
area.” 
66 See app. 1 
67 See e.g. Whitaker et al., v. Purdue, et al., United States District Court, Northern District of Georgia, 
Complaint filed June 20, 2006.  
68 In Arkansas, being subject to registration is just the first part of the analysis.  A registrant will also have 
to declared dangerous with a score of three or four on a four point scale. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-14-128(a) 
(Michie 2006) (effective July 16, 2003). 
69 It would be possible for some a person to be classified as a sex offender for registration purposes but not 
subject to residence or employment restrictions -- like in Arkansas and Louisiana. While this is a variation 
in classification it can have the same effect if all the enumerated offenses that subject one to registration are 
also the same that apply to the residence and employment restrictions -- like in Alabama where all those 
that have to register are subject to the residence requirements. ALA. CODE §§ 15-20-26(a), 15-20-21(1) (2006) 
(effective Sept. 1, 1999). 
70 See ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-1604.07(F) (LexisNexis 2006), CAL. PENAL CODE § 3003(g) (West 2006), 
FLA. STAT. § 947.1405(7)(a)(2) (2006), OR. REV. STAT. § 144.642(1)(a) (2006), TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC.
ANN. art. 42.12(13B) (Vernon 2006). 
71 IND. CODE ANN. § 11-13-3-4(g)(2)(B) (West 2006), 
72 WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.712(6)(a)(ii) (2006). 
73 WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.030(8). This provision expired July 1, 2006. 
74 See 2006 Wash. Senate Bill 6325.   
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high-risk sex offender whose victim was 18 years of age or younger from living within 
500 feet of a school or child care facility.75 
States that do not have a formal statewide restriction may have local ordinances 
that from town to town vary in degree.76 Logistically, communities, if left to their own 
devices, often take harsher stances against sex offenders to ensure that there is little or no 
available housing since the effect of not having such prohibitions will be felt in a smaller 
community. In such cases where only local ordinances exist, notice can be a problem.77 
Employment  
Along with residence restrictions, several states and local communities have also 
enacted employment restrictions intended to keep sex offenders away from schools, 
daycare facilities, playgrounds, public swimming pools, video arcades, recreation centers 
or public athletic fields and the like.78 Similar to the residence restrictions, this is 
employment zoning.  Not only are sex offenders prohibited from working at these 
locations, but they are also prohibited from working near these locations.79 Because most 
sex offenses against children are committed by individuals who have a prior relationship 
with their victims, there is a rational basis for keeping child offenders out of those 
relationship-building type jobs such as a teacher or counselor at a school.80 But when the 
law places a barrier around schools and playgrounds that block off large sections of the 
community, the impact of this restriction for employment purposes is enormous and 
unnecessary.   
Jobs that require workers to work at new locations on a regular basis such as 
plumbers, electricians, and construction are now off-limits to convicted sex offenders 
because of the risk of inadvertently entering the restricted zones.  Downtown areas will 
be off-limits to prior offenders who are attorneys, accountants or other white-collar jobs.  
With just one daycare facility located on one floor of a high-rise building, an entire city 
block could be off-limits. For all practical purposes, sex offenders will be relegated to 
agricultural work on the outskirts of the community.  If that is not feasible, then 
unemployment is the natural consequence of these restrictions. 
As a matter of public policy, it is strange to prefer idleness over work.  While 
unemployment is not the stated objective of these restrictions, it is often the result.  Being 
productive is a key component to successful rehabilitation and in preventing recidivism.81 
Employment plays a significant role in an individual's feeling of self-worth.  Taking 
away a person's ability to work attacks that person's dignity. With no documented proof 
 
75 See Sexual Predator Residency Restriction Act, LB 1199, Sections 27 through 29. [I have more on this, 
including comments from the bill sponsor, in the master document]. 
76 See e.g. Pamela A. MacLean, Suit Tests Power of Sex Offender Bans, Six Cities Want to Copy Law; They 
Wait For Result, 28 NAT'L L. J. 6, (col. 2) Oct. 3, 2005, News Seattle;  Associated Press, Cuero Wants to 
Require Sex Offenders to Post Yard Signs, FORT WORTH STAR-TELEGRAM Jan. 6, 2006, News, State. 
77 WOI-TV, Sex Offender's Wife Worries About Family Future, Nov. 23, 2005, "The Story County attorney 
says his county first started drawing up maps about a month ago. Since then, they've changed it about 
twenty times. As of Monday, their map still isn't finalized. That leaves sex offenders who know they need 
to move, not knowing where they can go." Available at http://www.woi-
tv.com/Global/story.asp?S=4056859&nav=1LFX . 
78 See table 3. 
79 See table 3. 
80 Center for Sex Offender Management, Myths and Facts About Sex Offenders, pg.1, Aug. 2000. 
81 Center For Sex Offender Management, Time to Work: Managing the Employment of Sex Offenders 
Under Community Supervision, pg.1, Jan. 2002. 
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that working in proximity to children increases sex crimes, it is odd that courts have done 
nothing to stop governments from interfering with the essential right to earn a living.  
Unencumbered without a home or a job, a convicted sex offender is more at risk to re-
offend.  After all, what else has he got to do?   
Not Banishment? 
 The impetus for these not-in-my-backyard ordinances and laws is the perceived 
need to keep children away from sex offenders.  After all, would any person, if given the 
choice, want a sex offender living next door?  Once one community sets up such a law 
driving the sex offenders out of its community, it forces the neighboring community to 
act in kind to avoid becoming a haven for sex offenders.82 When a community or state 
adopts a 1,000-foot rule or greater, that community is effectively removing that 
individual from its community by its strategic zoning.  By looking at a map with the 
1,000-foot radius placed in for every school, there is very little room for sex offenders to 
live.83 When daycare facilities, including residential homes that serve as a day care 
facility are added in, the possible living area is even smaller.  For states like Georgia, that 
also add in places where children might congregate, all school bus stops and churches, 
then the map is completely covered.84 
Banishment, not protection, is the desired goal of these laws.85 Georgia House 
Majority leader Jerry Keen, the chief sponsor of 2006 Georgia House Bill 1059, stated, 
"We want those people running away from Georgia.  Given the toughest laws here, we 
think a lot of people could move to another state.  If it becomes too onerous and too 
inconvenient, they just may want to live somewhere else.  And I don't care where, as long 
as it's not Georgia."86 The effect of this law in Georgia would be to send sex offenders 
scrambling to find housing and employment, regardless of how long they have lived in 
their current residence. That is the intent.  Rep. Keen echoed his sentiments in the house 
chambers when he said, “If someone did something now to my grandchildren, I think you 
and I would have the same reaction to that.  Those are the people we’re targeting.  Those 
are the people we are trying to get off the streets of this state, and those are the people 
that we are going to send a message to that if you have a propensity to that crime perhaps 
you need to move to another state.”87 If the law stands, Rep. Keen would get his wish.  In 
Forsyth County, Georgia, 64 of 68 registered sex offenders would have to move -- most 
likely out of the county.88 But the situation is even worse in neighboring counties.  For 
instance, in DeKalb County, Georgia, a suburb of Atlanta, 466 of the 466 registered sex 
 
82 See Mike Carlson, Not In My City, ORLANDO WEEKLY, Aug. 25, 2005.  
83 See app. 1. 
84 Act No. 571, Ga. Laws 2006 (HB 1059) codified at Ga. Code Ann § 42-1-15 (2006). 
85 Jason Garcia, Legislator seeks statewide limiting where sex offenders can live, SOUTH FLORIDA SUN-
SENTINEL, Sept. 15, 2005 (quoting Rep. Susan Goldstein who introduced a bill in the Florida legislature to 
increase the residence restrictions from 1000 feet to 2500, the ultimate goal is to "get these people out of 
our neighborhoods and hopefully out of our state.") Id.
86 Quote taken from Complaint filed in United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia, 
June 20, 2006, Wendy Whitaker, et al. v. Sonny Perdue, et al.  pg. 24 paragraph 56. 
87 See Statement by Representative Keen to Representative Roger Bruce during House debate on HB 1059, 
Feb. 2, 2006, House Internet Broadcasts, 
<http://www.georgia.gov/00/article/0,2086,4802_6107103_47120020,00.html.> 
88 Doug Nurse, How Push May Lead to a Shove. ATLANTA JOURNAL CONSTITUTION, July 6, 2006, 
<http://www.ajc.com/search/content/auto/epaper/editions/today/northside_44ca1799913b127500d2.html> 
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offenders would have to move.89 Pushed out of the urban areas, those affected are forced 
into the country or out of the state. 
 The real impetus of these bills is not on protecting children, but punishing former 
sex offenders once again.90 In response to criticism of the residence restrictions in 
Kentucky, Kenton County Sheriff Chuck Korzenborn stated, "I don't care how 
inconvenient we make it for these guys. . . . Don't commit the crime and you won't have 
to do the time."91 These zoning laws are so onerous to comply with that it is just a matter 
of time before innocent people are locked up.  Take the situation in the New Jersey 
townships of Jackson and Lakewood, where four months after adopting sex offender 
residency ordinances they still had not produced maps showing the “pedophile-free 
zones.”92 “There will be a map generated, not so someone can say, ‘Oh, that’s not where I 
can live,’” said a Jackson police captain. “It’s not a question of them knowing, but so we 
can know. If we want to charge them with the ordinance, we need the map.”93 
If the real purpose was protection, then states that have adopted these programs 
would offer proof that this community purging actually does protect the community and 
its children.  In fact, the states that have actually given thoughtful consideration to this 
proposal before voting on it have found that there is no correlation between residency and 
employment locale and recidivism.  Colorado and Minnesota both did extensive research 
on the issue and found that if anything, this forced exile only exacerbates the problem it 
purports to solve.94 
This forced migration of a select group of former criminals is unprecedented.  
There were forced migrations of Indian Tribes in the 1830s95 and of Japanese-Americans 
in the 1940s.96 There have been times when suspect groups of people, such as foreign 
agents, Communists, and aliens were subject to monitoring and regulation.97 It is unique 
 
89 Doug Nurse, How Push May Lead to a Shove. ATLANTA JOURNAL CONSTITUTION, July 6, 2006, 
<http://www.ajc.com/search/content/auto/epaper/editions/today/northside_44ca1799913b127500d2.html>  
Other metro Atlanta counties would have similar totals: In Cherokee County 90 of 95; Clayton County 190 
of 220;  Cobb County 204 of 208; Henry County 100 of 108; and Rockdale 29 of 29.  Id. 
90 Joyce Blay, Police Waiting for Maps to Enforce Residency Law, TRI-TOWN NEWS, Sept. 22, 2005. 
91 William Croyle, Sex Offenders Put on Notice CINCINNATI ENQUIRER August 14, 2006. 
92 Id. 
93 Id. (emphasis added). 
94 See Colorado Dep't of Public Safety, Report on Safety Issues Raised By Living Arrangements For and 
Locations of Sex Offenders in the Community, (prepared for the Colorado State Judiciary Committees, 
Senate and House of Representatives) 2004, (finding no correlation between where sex offenders lived in 
comparison to where other criminals lived therefore, a residence restriction would not be a productive 
method to control recidivism) available at 
http://dcj.state.co.us/odvsom/Sex_Offender/SO_Pdfs/FullSLAFinal01.pdf ; Minnesota Dep't of 
Corrections, Level Three Sex Offenders Residential Placement Issues, (Report to the Legislature) 2003. 
(finding that the residence restrictions would force the state to provide housing for those displaced by such 
an act and that the cost of creating new housing would be too high along with a belief that residential 
restrictions would not enhance community safety)  available at 
http://www/corr.state.mn.us/publications/legislativereports/pdf/2004/Lvl%203%20SEX%20OFFENDERS
%20report%202003%20(revised%202-04).pdf 
95 Pursuant to the Indian Removal Act see http://ngeorgia.com/history/nghisttt.html. 
96 Act of March 21, 1942, 56 Stat.173, 18 USCA 97a.  See also Korematsu v. United States 323 U.S. 214 
(1944).  
97 Michele L. Earl-Hubbard. The Child Sex Offender Registration Laws: The Punishment, Liberty 
Depravation, and Unintended Results Associated with the Scarlet Letter Laws of the 1990s.90 NW. U. L
REV. 788, 815 fn.183. (1996). 
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for a law to force one class of individuals away from the general population as if they 
were contagious.98 It is outrageous for any court to mischaracterize laws that require 
citizens living in a law-abiding manner to quit their jobs and uproot their families, taking 
them out of their chosen communities and forcing them into underdeveloped areas by not 
calling it what it is -- banishment. 
V. Penalties For Being In the Zone 
Violations of the residence or employment restrictions are much more than just a 
slap on the wrist.  For most states the first violation is a felony.99 In Alabama and 
Georgia, it is a severe felony with up to 30 years for one violation.100 In many cases a 
violation of this prohibition is punished with greater severity than the crime that made the 
person a sexual offender to begin with.   
Interestingly, for the most part there is no mens rea required to violate these 
restrictions.  A sexual offender may be strictly liable for complying with these 
prohibitions.101 The basic problem with this is the fact that the prohibited areas are 
growing constantly.  An individual may live or work outside a protected zone only to 
have a daycare facility pop up near the sex offender.  In such a case, the sex offender 
would have little recourse and no knowledge of such an event.  
What is really going on is that these regulations are a way to punish sex offenders 
twice for one criminal act.  Feeling unsatisfied and impotent, states and local 
communities set legal traps for the convicted sex offenders to fall into so that they can 
incarcerate them again.  It is just a matter of time before a sex offender who tries to 
remain in a community will violate these specially crafted restrictions.   
VI. Unintended Consequences 
There are unintended consequences of the residence and employment restrictions 
that may actually exacerbate the problem that the laws were intended to correct.  Because 
these laws are often passed without much consideration as to the results of 
implementation, there have been many negatives consequences.  The shortsightedness of 
these laws is that in their zeal to protect they give the sex offender little hope of 
redemption.  “We express a desire for rehabilitation of the individual, while 
simultaneously we do everything to prevent it. . . . We tell him to return to the norm of 
behavior, yet we brand him as virtually unemployable; he is required to live with his 
normal activities severely restricted and we react with sickened wonder and disgust when 
he returns to a life of crime.”102 Coupled with the fact that these restrictions will not 
work and the negatives far exceed the positives.  That is why the Iowa County Attorney's 
 
98 In an effort to curb prostitution, Richmond, Virginia, city officials want to make parts of the city off 
limits to particular individuals unless they lived, worked or worshipped in the area.  Jim Nolan, Zones 
Would Bar Prostitutes, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH Sept.11, 2006.  
99 Alabama, Arkansas, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Missouri, and Tennessee.  See infra table 2. 
100 See infra table 2. 
101 Offenders are strictly liable in Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Missouri, Ohio, and South Dakota.  
See infra table 2.    
102 Morrissey v. Brewer, 443 F.2d 942, 953 (8th Cir. 1971) (en banc) (Lay, J., dissenting) As cited by 
Michael Duster, Out of Sight, Out of Mind: State Attempts to Banish Sex Offenders, 53 DRAKE L. REV. 711 
(2005) (note). 
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Association has publicly called for the overturning of Iowa's 2,000 foot residence 
restriction.103 
By pushing sex offenders away from society, these laws can isolate sex offenders 
from their friends, co-workers and other support systems.  Without support, the sex 
offender is left to fend off any deviant urges on his or her own.  Without employment and 
residence displacement, a sex offender will face idle time, which is a factor in favor of 
recidivism.104 Social science research indicates that "during the past 20 years, research on 
recidivism of the general criminal population identified a history of unstable employment 
as one of the factors that consistently is associated with criminal behavior."105 As 
Kathleen Colebank, a supervisor for Kentucky's sex offender treatment program states, 
"With many of the people we treat, isolation played a role in them committing the offense 
and we risk replicating that."106 
In areas where residence restrictions exist, there are limited choices for housing 
for those classified as sex offenders.  As a result, the likelihood exists that sex offenders 
will be concentrated in certain areas of town or certain areas just outside of town, if they 
can find any reasonable housing at all.107 The market value of a neighborhood full of 
registered sex offenders would most likely be depressed much like an area of town 
deemed to be a "high crime area."  Communities would then react against any 
concentration of sex offenders.  For example, the small town of Ely, Iowa, a town 
without a single school or daycare center, passed local ordinances banning sex offenders 
from living near the city park, playground or library, which effectively eliminated all 
residential areas in the town.108 “We felt a little vulnerable,” said an Ely resident. “For a 
lot of towns like ours, we can become the only place available for sex offenders.”109 Fear 
then is the driving force. 
Residence restrictions leave many offenders homeless.  The coverage area is so 
large, especially in 2,000-feet areas, that there is limited housing available.  In states or 
communities where multiple difficult-to-identify triggers exist, such as daycare facilities, 
school bus stops or places where children congregate, even a smaller prohibited area 
severely limits reasonable housing.  Much of the permissible property is located in high-
rent districts or in more rural areas where housing is limited.   
The homeless problem creates an enforcement problem.  Although offenders are 
required to provide a valid address when they register, it is not uncommon for an offender 
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to have to move to comply with the residence law.  Subsequent reporting is poor.110 In 
Iowa, for example, the number of missing sex offenders has more than doubled since the 
residence restrictions went into effect in September 2005.111 Keeping up with the 
migration of sex offenders will be a full-time job for law enforcement.112 Most do not 
have the money or the manpower to devote so much time to herding people out of town.  
Other states are losing track of their registered sex offenders, as well.  Sex offenders 
simply do not bother to register anymore because it will only lead to an immediate arrest.  
In North Carolina, sex offenders are now missing in record numbers.113 
Another unintended consequence would be the desire to create illegitimate 
sanctuaries.  Local communities would actively increase the number of protected areas by 
increasing the number of public parks or lowering standards for residential daycare 
facilities.  In some states, it is fairly easy to have one’s home considered a child-care 
facility, which would entitle it to the protection zone.  In Iowa, for instance, as the 
number of day care facilities increases it becomes more and more difficult to what 
locations are off-limits.114 While there is nothing inherently wrong with having a surplus 
of daycare facilities, the classification of many would be disingenuous.  Similarly in 
states that include school bus stops as a prohibited area, there would be impetus for 
communities to artificially designate areas to zone off more of the community.115 
Another enforcement problem is created by treating all sex offenders the same 
regardless of the nature of their offense.  By treating all sex offenders the same, the 
number of individuals classified as a sex offender becomes too large to effectively 
manage.  The number of sex offenders will grow at a pace much faster than the 
authorities can handle.  Special units will need to be created that focus on the monitoring 
of sex offenders.  State and local governments, already strapped for funds, are not 
equipped to handle all the work required by these restrictive ordinances. 
These restrictions displace not only individuals, but also their families.116 The 
impact of relocating is not just felt by the offender because the whole family unit must 
move.  A family may have to find new friends, attend new schools and find new places to 
worship. Some families are faced with a difficult decision because of the reduction in the 
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quality of life in staying together some may choose to remain without the offending 
family member.   
Finally, by establishing these residence and employment restrictions a community 
is merely passing its perceived problem on to the next town.  One by one, communities 
are adopting laws -- not to handle a perceived current problem with local sex offenders -- 
but as a defense mechanism to prevent displaced offenders from other areas from settling 
in their community.  In Orange Beach Alabama, residents not satisfied with the 
Alabama's 2000 foot restriction passed an ordinance that increases the prohibited zones to 
four miles.117 As community after community forbids offenders from residing in their 
midst, sex offenders are left to wander the earth in search of acceptance. 
VII. Constitutionality of These Restrictions 
With the U.S. Supreme Court's denial of certiorari in Doe v. Miller, the Court 
currently tacitly permits residence and employment restrictions.118 The key aspect in 
determining the constitutionality of these restrictions lies in whether the Court views 
these restrictions as civil or criminal.  The Court in Smith v. Doe upheld the sex offender 
registrations as civil and regulatory because they did not prohibit the sex offender from 
doing anything, it merely required them to do something that is not uncommon.119 Under 
the Alaska statutory scheme, sex offenders just had to register themselves, much like any 
other person would a motor vehicle.  If a vehicle is moved from one jurisdiction to 
another, the owner is required to update that registration.  Having to register as a sex 
offender does not prevent a sex offender from moving.120 Surprisingly, most courts that 
have had opportunity to weigh in on this issue have upheld residence and employment 
restrictions as constitutionality.121 The U.S. Supreme Court has not fully examined the 
constitutionality of residence and employment restrictions but does suggest that there are 
limits to the restrictions placed on sex offenders who have served their time.122 
A. Ex Post Facto Laws 
In general, ex post facto laws are laws passed after a particular event has occurred 
to make the previous activity illegal.123 A prohibition against ex post facto laws is found 
in the United States Constitution124 and serves as a foundational principle for our ordered 
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scheme of liberty.125 The United States Constitution also prohibits states from enacting 
such laws.126 Ex post facto laws are often considered void.127 
In its first Ex Post Facto Clause case, the Supreme Court described four ways a 
legislature could run afoul of it.128 Justice Chase wrote:  
1st. Every law that makes an action, done before the passing of the law, 
and which was innocent when done, criminal; and punishes such action. 
2nd. Every law that aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than it was, 
when committed. 3rd. Every law that changes the punishment, and inflicts 
a greater punishment, than the law annexed to the crime, when committed. 
4th. Every law that alters the legal rules of evidence, and receives less, or 
different, testimony, than the law required at the time of the commission 
of the offence, in order to convict the offender. All these, and similar laws, 
are manifestly unjust and oppressive.129 
"[B]ut the restriction not to pass any ex post facto law, was to secure the person of 
the subject from injury, or punishment, in consequence of such law."130 
For a law to be ex post facto, it must also “disadvantage the offender affected by 
it.”131 There is no requirement that it hinder any particular right.  In fact, “[i]t need not 
impair a ‘vested right.’ Even if a statute merely alters penal provisions accorded by the 
grace of the legislature, it violates the Ex Post Facto Clause if it is both retrospective and 
more onerous than the law in effect on the date of the offense.”132 For example, a change 
in state law that altered how "good time credit" was calculated for inmates was an ex post 
facto violation even though there is no constitutional right to "good time credit."133 
Determining if a statute violates the Ex Post Facto Clause hinges on the purpose 
of the law.  If the legislature meant to impose punishment, then the statute violates the Ex 
Post Facto Clause if it punishes previous activity.134 If the intention was to establish "civil 
proceedings" by enacting a regulatory scheme that is civil and non-punitive, then the 
court must look at the effect of the law.135 
The first step in the analysis is to ascertain the legislative intent.  Courts give the 
legislature the benefit of the doubt in determining intent, especially if there is an 
explicitly stated intent within the statute.136 A high standard of proof is required to 
overcome even a superficial statement of intent.  The U.S. Supreme Court reaffirmed in 
Smith, "only the clearest proof will suffice to override that intent and transform what has 
been denominated a civil remedy into a criminal penalty."137 Various courts have taken 
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great pains to find a civil intent.  For instance, the placement and naming of an act is 
given more weight if it claims to be civil and is found in the civil code.138 The lack of 
any identification or its placement in the criminal code is often treated as having little 
probative value.139 Regardless of the label or placement of a restriction, the inquiry does 
not end at this point. 
In examining the legislative intent, it is important to see the lengths the legislature 
went in analyzing the alleged problem.  The courts must be sensitive to the fact that there 
may not be legitimate debate and discussion on sex offender restrictions because of the 
lack of real representation by the effected class: convicted sex offenders.140 The few 
states that have taken the time to see if residence or employment restrictions would 
actually work did not enact such provisions.141 Most legislative bodies act in haste with 
one goal in mind: removing sex offenders from the community.142 The Supreme Court 
has said that the “failure to consider, or to use, alternative and less harsh methods to 
achieve a non-punitive objective can help to show that legislature’s ‘purpose was to 
punish.’ ”143 
Next a court must look at the practical effects of the restrictions and decide if 
these restrictions are regulatory or punitive.144 A hardship placed on an individual is not 
enough to make a restriction punitive.  For instance, just because a restriction might cause 
the community to distrust a sex offender, it will not be punitive unless it encourages an 
act of retribution against the sex offender.145 As a result, sex offender registrations are not 
considered punitive,146nor is civil commitment for sexually violent predators.147 
The Court in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez set forth seven factors to assist in 
determining if a statute's restrictions constitute actual punishment.148 These factors are 
not exhaustive but are helpful.  The court will balance the factors, which at times, 
contradict each other.  They include: whether the sanction involves an affirmative 
disability or restraint; whether it has historically been regarded as a punishment; whether 
it comes into play only on a finding of scienter; whether its operation will promote the 
traditional aims of punishment: retribution and deterrence; whether the behavior to which 
it applies is already a crime; whether an alternative purpose to which it may rationally be 
connected is assignable for it; and whether it appears excessive in relation to the 
alternative purpose assigned.149 
The civil/criminal analysis under Mendoza-Martinez tends to be result oriented.  
Because there is no true test or measuring stick to distinguish the two, courts seem to 
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weigh the factors according to the preferred outcome. How else could the court construe 
confinement for those considered dangerous to be civil and not criminal, preventive and 
not punitive, when the result of the restraints are exactly the same?150 As residence and 
employment restrictions proliferate the landscape, court should eventually reach the point 
at which these restrictions are considered punishment and not regulation.151 
There are several important factual distinctions that distinguish residence and 
employment restrictions from the two previous sanctions which were deemed regulatory: 
sex offender registration and civil commitment.  Residence and employment restrictions 
place an affirmative burden on several fundamental liberty interests -- where to live, 
work, raise a family and even travel.  The freedom to live a law-abiding life in the 
manner of one's own choosing should not be terminated by a criminal conviction.  More 
importantly, it should not be a result of conviction.  Unlike registration requirements, 
these restrictions are a new and unexpected restraint on sex offenders’ lives.152 The 
ramifications of not being able to live and work where you choose is not a product of the 
crime; it is a product of the legislation.  
 Residence and employment restrictions are not like registration requirements 
because residence and employment restrictions actually impose a physical restraint on the 
sex offender.  The court in Smith v. Doe found that Alaska's registration law was not 
punitive because "the Act imposes no physical restraint, and so does not resemble the 
punishment of imprisonment, which is the paradigmatic affirmative disability of 
restraint."153 The court even goes on to say that "the Act does not restrain activities sex 
offenders may pursue but leaves them free to change jobs or residences."154 Thus, the 
Smith Court implies that a residence or employment restriction might be improper.  
The Smith Court does note that particular employment prohibitions can be 
legitimate civil sanctions.  For example, the court has authorized the forbidding 
participation in the banking industry,155 working as a union official156 or revocation of a 
medical license.157 But these restrictions are case specific and are related to the 
underlying deviant behavior that resulted in such a sanction.  Restrictions that prohibit 
working within a certain distance of a school or church have no particular correlation to 
the previous employment of the sex offender or the relationship, if any, of the 
employment to the criminal offense.   
These restrictions are an inverted detention.  In prison, offenders are confined to a 
small space while society continues around it.  Under these residence and employment 
schemes, the walls are built around society and the offender is forced to live confined  
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outside them.158 Essentially towns become gated communities with severe punishments 
for trespassers.  The issue boils down to the greater of two motives. Do these invisible 
walls protect society or punish the offender, or both?  If the objective is to incapacitate 
the sex offenders so that they cannot re-offend, then that is a form of punishment.159 
Unlike civil commitment, which provides some effort at rehabilitation through 
counseling and psychological treatment, residence and employment restrictions have no 
benefit to the sex offender.160 These restrictions are for the protection of the public by 
removing these “dangerous” individuals.  There is no evidence that these restrictions will 
cure a sex offender of his or her deviant actions.  In his dissent in Hendricks, Justice 
Breyer states, “The Allen Court's focus upon treatment, as a kind of touchstone helping to 
distinguish civil from punitive purposes, is not surprising, for one would expect a non-
punitive statutory scheme to confine, not simply in order to protect, but also in order to 
cure.”161 There needs to be some benefit to all interested parties: the state and the 
convicted offender.  Protecting society alone is not enough.  Especially since there is no 
proof that these restrictions will even protect society.  
Most of the residence and employment zoning restrictions apply only to a special 
class of individuals: those who have previously committed a sexual offense.162 The civil 
commitment contemplated in Hendricks involved offenders who had also been adjudged 
to be dangerous.  The Supreme Court has found that "an imposition of restrictive 
measures on sex offenders adjudged to be dangerous is a legitimate non-punitive 
governmental objective."163 What is often missing from sex offender residence and 
employment restrictions is a finding of dangerousness with the individual offenders.  The 
legislative trend is for residence restrictions to apply to all who are required to register 
with no finding of dangerousness.164 For example, Arkansas and Louisiana apply these 
restrictions only on those found to be sexually violent predators.165 This overbroad 
classification does not take into account the life situation of its victims and creates 
 
158 See Wayne A. Logan, A Study in "Actuarial Justice": Sex Offender Classification Practice and 
Procedure, 3 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 593 (2000) "To a significant extent, the laws serve 'a kind of waste 
management function,' a massive corrections experiment taking place beyond prison walls." Id.
159 4 W. Blackstone, Commentaries *11-*12 (An objective of criminal law is to “depriv[e] the party 
injuring of the power to do future mischief.”) As quoted in Kansas v. Hendricks, 321 U.S. 346, 379 
(1997)(Breyer, J., dissenting opinion) See also United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 458 (“Punishment 
serves several purposes: retribution, rehabilitation, deterrent – and preventative.  One of the reasons society 
imprisons those convicted of crimes is to keep them from inflicting future harm, but that does not make 
imprisonment any the less punishment”) Id. See also Herbert Packer, "The Limits of the Criminal Sanction" 
Stanford University Press, 1968. 
160 Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364, 369 (1986); See also Kansas v. Hendrick, 521 U.S. 346, 381 (Justice 
Breyer, in his dissent, suggests that withholding or delaying treatment until the end or near the end of the 
prison sentence, so that further detention is required, is a scheme that looks punitive.) 
161 Kansas v. Hendricks at 382 (dissenting opinion). 
162 Dept. of Revenue of Mont. v. Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. 767, 781 (found that a tax on marijuana was 
“conditioned on the commission of a crime” “is ‘significant of [its] penal and prohibitory intent’”)) citation 
omitted)); as cited in Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 380 (1980) (Breyer, J., dissent) 
163 Kansas v. Hendricks, at 363. 
164 Six (Michigan, Idaho, Indiana, Mississippi, South Dakota and Kentucky) of the Seven (Virginia) states 
that created new post-sentence residence in 2006 were registration driven.  Three (Georgia, Oklahoma, 
Tennessee) of the four (Missouri) additional states that amended their previous laws to increase the 
restrictions in 2006 were also registration driven. See table 1. 
165 See ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-14-128(a) (Michie 2006) (effective July 16, 2003); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:91.1(A)(2) 
(West 2006) (effective June 28, 2001). 
23
unjustified havoc.  For example, an 80-year-old Lexington, Kentucky, resident living in a 
nursing home, where he is treated for dementia and heart ailments, will have to move to 
the nearest nursing home facility that satisfies Kentucky's new harsher residence 
restrictions -- two hours away.166 These restrictions treat all sex offenders the same 
regardless if the offense was a misdemeanor or felony, a first or subsequent offense, a 
predatory act or temporary lapse in judgment.  The desire of these restrictions is to keep 
the handful of truly deviant predators away from children, but its application is 
overbearing and punitive on the vast majority of sex offenders. 
Finally, violation of a true regulatory scheme results in a fine or injunction but 
certainly does not carry a possible thirty-year prison term.  Thirty years is a significant 
criminal sanction available for only the most heinous crimes.  With these laws in effect, 
those classified as sex offenders live their lives in fear that they may inadvertently, and 
with no malicious intent, violate this law and basically throw away the rest of their lives.  
These restrictions are significant restraints equal to and perhaps even greater than the 
punishment received for the underlying offense. There is a severe impact on those who 
have served their time but languish under the status of being a sex offender.  Individuals 
who have paid their debt are now required to pay more.  Subsequent punishments are 
clear violations of the Ex Post Facto Clause.  
B. Other Constitutional Claims 
There is no more fundamental American right than the right to own property and 
earn a livelihood.167 That right is guaranteed by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, 
which require due process before these interests can be taken away.  The tension is 
between a state's alleged exercise of its police power in the interest of the general welfare 
and the process by which individuals lose their individual liberty.  A state’s police power 
does not give it unlimited power over individual liberty.  As Justice Harlan stated, "the 
police power cannot be put forward as an excuse for oppressive and unjust legislation"168 
When a state is exercising its police power there must be a balance between the public 
and private interests involved in order for the regulations to be reasonable.169 
Sex offender residence and employment restrictions may violate other 
constitutional provisions, but analysis of those claims is typically hindered by the 
predicate determination that the restrictions are civil in nature.  For instance, if a court 
finds the proceedings and actions civil in nature, then the Fifth Amendment against self-
incrimination right does not attach.170 Similarly, if the court refuses to call sanctions 
punishment, then the constitutional scrutiny is greatly diminished.171 
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A finding that a law is civil in nature effectively thwarts most constitutional 
claims.  Likewise, a determination that the restrictions are actually punishment will result 
in multiple constitutional violations.  Regardless of the number of constitutional 
deficiencies, a court need only find one constitutional violation to make an act 
unconstitutional. 
Other constitutional claims are available, but will not be discussed in this article. 
They include the following: Violation of substantive due process under the 14th 
Amendment by restricting the right to own a home in location of one's own choosing,172 
by violating the right to work173 and the right to travel;174 Violation of Equal Protection 
Clause of the 14th Amendment by treating sex offenders different than all other 
citizens;175 Violation of the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause of the 8th 
Amendment;176 Violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause;177 Violation of the Fifth 
Amendment right against self-incrimination.178 
VIII. The Court Does Have its Breaking Point 
Even though most of the previous case law has sanctified sex offender residence 
and employment restrictions, there does seem to be a point where the U.S. Supreme 
Court will say enough is enough.  In his dissent in Hendricks, Justice Kennedy warns that 
activities such as civil commitment for sex offenders would cross the line if “[it] were to 
become a mechanism for retribution or general deterrence, or if it were shown that mental 
abnormality is too imprecise a category to offer a solid basis for concluding that civil 
 
172 See Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974). Zoning ordinances that have the effect of restricting the 
number of unrelated persons who may live together in a residential zone are not violative of Fourteenth 
Amendment equal protection.  So long as the zoning ordinance bears a rational relationship to a permissible 
state objective, it is constitutional.  Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (holding that a 
housing ordinance limiting occupancy of a dwelling unit to a narrow definition of "family" violated Due 
Process).  
173 See e.g. Wilson v. Loew's Inc., 355 U.S. 597, 599 (1958) (There is a "fundamental right to work"). 
174 See United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 757 (1966).  See also Saenz v. Roe 526 U.S. 489, 498 (1999).  
175 See e.g. League of United Latin American Citizens v. Perry, 126 S.Ct. 2594 (2006) (Treating people 
differently violates equal protection) 
176 These restrictions are often disproportionate to the crime in degree and scope as to make them 
unconstitutional.  A person convicted of a misdemeanor expects to receive a punishment that last less than 
a year.  Likewise a person convicted of a felony expects that the maximum amount of time his liberty 
would be restricted would be the statutorily established sentencing limits.  It was never contemplated that a 
misdemeanor conviction would, some ten years after the final disposition, create a new debilitating restraint 
on his or her liberty.  It is cruel and unusual punishment for a strict liability crime to carry a severe sanction 
such as a prison sentence of 10 or more years.  It is fundamentally unfair to imprison someone for a 
technical violation when there is no evil intent. Scholars have noted a shift in public opinion regarding 
strict liability crimes.  See Catherine L. Carpenter, On Statutory Rape, Strict Liability, and the Public 
Welfare Offense Model, 53 AM. U. L. REV. 313, 380 (2003); Carol. S. Steiker, Punishment and Procedure: 
Punishment Theory and the Criminal-Civil Divide, 85 GEO. L. J. 775 (1997).  Yet that is precisely what the 
residence and employment restrictions do. 
177 A new restraint on liberty after being released from prison should be considered a second punishment 
for the same criminal action. See e.g. Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93, 101-102 (1997). 
178 Every state has some form of registration for sex offenders.  Variations exist on the frequency and the 
amount of information required depending on the state and the level/classification of the offender.  All 
registrations require that the offender provide a current residence.  It is possible that in the process of 
following the law and registering as a sex offender, that an individual may be unknowingly incriminating 
himself if the address listed is within a prohibited area. 
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commitment is justified, our precedents would not suffice to validate it.”179 Perhaps it 
will start with a willingness to take down a statute that is imprecise in its understanding 
and application, such as in Georgia.  In July 2006, the addition of school bus stops to the 
list of places a sex offender cannot live or work within 1,000 feet was deemed too 
imprecise because there was no formal declaration of a school bus stop.180 Or perhaps 
the Court will conclude that the classification of sex offenders is too large to precisely 
indicate future dangerousness.  As legislative bodies continue to push sex offenders out, 
by adding prohibited places or enlarging the zones around the prohibited places, reason 
will win out over passion as the punitive intent of these laws becomes even more evident. 
IX. A Better Solution 
Merely keeping convicted sex offenders away from particular areas does nothing 
to keep them away from children or any other potential victims.  A key aspect of most 
sex offenses is that the assailant and the victim often have a relationship with each other 
before the violation occurs.  The stranger danger for sex crimes is actually very low.  
Whatever danger is posed, it is probably best handled by educating children how to act.181 
And if there is a desire to separate children from child sexual offenders, then laws that 
hinder relationship building, such as prohibiting a child sex offender from working at a 
daycare or school, would be narrowly tailored, less restrictive and more effective.   
A better solution to the problem would be to discontinue the process exiling the 
convicted sex offenders from the general population once they have paid their debt to 
society.  If society is so certain that sex offenders have not paid enough, then perhaps the 
incarceration time should increase.  At a minimum, some sort of rehabilitation and 
treatment should be used throughout the confinement period so that society could better 
trust that the person leaving the penitentiary is changed from the one who entered.  
Preventing offenders from being able to reasonably assimilate back into the general 
population does not serve any legitimate purpose other than making politicians feel like 
they are tough on crime. 
Instead of simply hoping that incarceration for any length of time will rehabilitate 
a sex offender, a more prudent approach would be to provide some comprehensive 
counseling while incarcerated, so that whenever a sex offender is released we can put our 
faith in the belief that they will not re-offend instead of setting up arbitrary barriers that 
debilitate any hope of assimilation.  Alternatively, sex offenders could spend the last 
portion of their sentence in a sex offender halfway house where they could receive the 
counseling and assistance needed to rejoin society and overcome any deviant urges.182 It 
is presumptively unfair to punish someone for the status crime of being a sex offender 
rather than for the underlying crime that made them a sex offender to begin with.  Giving 
first- time offenders probation with little or no jail time but sentencing them to a felony 
when they fail to move from a house they have lived in for the past 10 years without 
 
179 Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 373 (1997) (concurring opinion). 
180 Jill Young Miller, Sex Offender Law Muddled, ATLANTA JOURNAL-CONSTITUTION, July 26, 2006 at A1, 
A9.   
181 A greater danger for children may come from internet chat-room stalkers.  Some of NBC Dateline’s 
most popular shows involve catching child predators. Residence and Employment restrictions would not 
solve this problem at all.  Except by keeping some sex offenders unemployed it gives them more time to 
chat. 
182 For example in Minneapolis, Minnesota, Alpha Human Services offers an Adult Residential Program 
specifically designed for repeat sexual offenders.  See www.alphaservices.org for more information.   
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incident does not cure any problem.  It is merely a means by which sex offenders can be 
punished a second time for their crime without running afoul of any double jeopardy 
claims. 
If it can be proven that a particular amount of time is necessary to rehabilitate, 
then that amount of time should be the minimum time required to be spent by all 
noteworthy sex offenders.  Releasing individuals before they are competent to control 
their anti-social desires and creating a massive system to monitor and track them until the 
inevitable day occurs when they re-offend is not in society’s best interest.  Once a person 
has served his full sentence his debt to society is paid.  He or she now owes society 
nothing for his past actions -- only the promise to live debt-free henceforth.   If the 
current punishment is not sufficient, then it must be increased so that society will receive 
its payment upfront, not after the fact.   Residence and employment restrictions re-punish 
those who do not deserve additional punishment.  That practice is contrary to our ordered 
scheme of liberty and must seize.   The time has come for the courts to protect the 
interests of this helpless group and end this practice. 
There is no arguing the fact that sex crimes are terrible.  But so are lots of 
different crimes.  Everyone makes mistakes.183 It seems that for this broad spectrum of 
crimes there is a one-strike-and-you’re-out policy.  With recidivism so low and the 
likelihood of repentance high, it is a shame that people like Lori Sue Collins are treated 
as lepers.  The good in her is ignored as she is cast out, away from society and forced into 
a nomadic existence by a twenty-first century lynch mob.  If there is no redemption 
possible for sex offenders, then why not act accordingly and lock them up forever or 
execute them.  If not, no matter how much we hate the sin, we have to reach out to the 
sinner.  We must offer sex offenders real hope, because without hope, an individual will 
act without conscious; then everyone loses. 
 
183 “For all have sinned and fall short of the Glory of God” Romans 3:23 (New American Standard). 
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TABLE 1 – SEX OFFENDER RESIDENCE PROHIBITED ZONES 
 
State Residence 
prohibition 
applies to: 
What is the 
prohibited zone? 
 
How long is 
an offender 
subject to the 
restriction? 
Possibility 
of release? 
Alabama Persons convicted 
of a “criminal sex 
offense”184 
Within 2,000 feet 
of any school or 
child care 
facility185 
Life186 No 
Arkansas Persons required 
to register as a sex 
offender AND 
who are assigned 
risk level 3 (high) 
or 4 (SVP)187 
Within 2,000 feet 
of any elementary 
or secondary 
school or daycare 
facility188 
15 years to 
life189 
Yes190 
Delaware Persons convicted 
of certain sex 
offenses involving 
a child under 
16191 
Within 500 feet of 
the property of 
any school192 
Life193 No 
Florida Persons convicted 
of certain sex 
offenses involving 
a child under 
16194 
Within 1,000 feet 
of any school, day 
care center, park, 
or playground195 
Life196 No 
Georgia Persons required 
to register as a sex 
offender197 
Within 1,000 feet 
of any child care 
facility, church, 
school, or area 
where minors 
congregate198 
10 years to 
life199 
Yes200 
184 ALA. CODE §§ 15-20-26(a), 15-20-21(1) (2006) (effective Sept. 1, 1999). 
185 ALA. CODE § 15-20-26(a). 
186 ALA. CODE § 15-20-33(a). 
187 ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-14-128(a) (Michie 2006) (effective July 16, 2003). 
188 Id.
189 ARK. CODE ANN. § 12-12-919(a), (b)(1). 
190 ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 12-12-917(h), 919(b)(1), 922(b)(1)(a). A sex offender may request an administrative review 
challenging the level 3 or 4 risk assignment, request a risk reassessment every five years, and petition a court for 
release from registration requirements after 15 years. By lowering the risk classification to level 1 or 2, or obtaining 
release from registration requirements, a sex offender will no longer be subject to the residence restriction. 
191 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1112(b)(4) (2006) (effective July 25, 1995). 
192 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1112(a)(1). 
193 The statute places no limit on the period of time an offender is subject to the residence prohibition, thus the 
restriction lasts indefinitely. 
194 FLA. STAT. § 794.065(1) (2006) (effective Oct. 1, 2004). 
195 Id.
196 The statute places no limit on the period of time an offender is subject to the residence prohibition, thus the 
restriction lasts indefinitely. 
197 GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-15(a) (2006) (effective July 1, 2006). 
198 Id. Georgia’s sex offender residency prohibition was amended in 2006 to 1) make it a crime to loiter within the 
prohibited  zone, 2) include “churches” among the restricted areas, and 3) add school bus stops and public/community 
swimming pools to the definition of  “area where minors congregate.” See Act No. 571, 2006 Ga. Laws (HB 1059). 
199 GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-12(g). 
200 Id. Effective July 1, 2006, sexual offenders may petition a court for release from registration requirements after 10 
years. If successful, the offender will no longer be subject to the residence restriction. 
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TABLE 1 – SEX OFFENDER RESIDENCE PROHIBITED ZONES 
(CONTINUED) 
 
State Residence 
prohibition 
applies to: 
What is the 
prohibited zone? 
How long is 
an offender 
subject to the 
restriction? 
Possibility 
of release? 
Idaho Persons required 
to register as a sex 
offender201 
Within 500 feet of 
the property on 
which  a school is 
located202 
10 years to 
life203 
Yes204 
Illinois Persons convicted 
of a child sex 
offense, or 
certified as a 
sexually 
dangerous person 
whose victim was 
under 18205 
Within 500 feet of 
any school that 
persons under the 
age of 18 attend206 
Life207 No208 
Indiana Persons required 
to register as a sex 
offender who are 
1) sexually 
violent predators, 
or 2) have been 
convicted of 
certain offenses 
involving a 
minor209 
Within 1,000 feet 
of school 
property, a youth 
program center, or 
public park210 
10 years to 
life211 
Yes212 
Iowa Persons who have 
committed a 
criminal, 
aggravated, 
sexually violent, 
or other offense 
involving a 
minor213 
Within 2,000 feet 
of a elementary or 
secondary school 
or child care 
facility214 
Life215 No 
201 IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-8329(1) (2006) (effective July 1, 2006). 
202 IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-8329(1)(d). 
203 IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-8310(1). 
204 Id. Sex offenders who are not required to register for life may petition a court for release from registration 
requirements after 10 years, and, if successful, will no longer be subject to the residence restriction. 
205 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-9.3(b-5), (c)(1) (2006) (effective July 7, 2000). 
206 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-9.3(b-5). 
207 The statute places no limit on the period of time an offender is subject to the residence prohibition, thus the 
restriction lasts indefinitely. 
208 A “sexually dangerous person” may appeal the designation. 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 205/9. But, even if successful, the 
offender will remain subject to the residence prohibition if his/her underlying conviction is a qualifying child sex 
offense. 
209 IND. CODE ANN. § 35-42-4-11(a) (West 2006) (effective July 1, 2006). 
210 IND. CODE ANN. § 35-42-4-11(c). 
211 IND. CODE ANN. § 11-8-8-19. 
212 Id. The duty to register, and consequently the residence restriction, terminates after 10 years for certain offenders. A 
sexually violent predator may petition a court to have the SVP status removed 10 years after the initial classification. 
IND. CODE ANN. § 35-38-1-7.5(g). 
213 IOWA CODE ANN. § 692A.2A(1), (2) (West 2006) (effective July 1, 2002). 
214 IOWA CODE ANN. § 692A.2A(2). 
215 The statute places no limit on the period of time an offender is subject to the residence prohibition, thus the 
restriction lasts indefinitely. 
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TABLE 1 – SEX OFFENDER RESIDENCE PROHIBITED ZONES 
(CONTINUED) 
 
State Residence 
prohibition 
applies to: 
What is the 
prohibited zone? 
How long is 
an offender 
subject to the 
restriction? 
Possibility 
of release? 
Kentucky Persons required 
to register as a 
sex offender216 
Within 1,000 feet 
of a school, 
preschool, public 
playground, or 
day care facility217 
20 years to 
life218 
Yes219 
Louisiana Sexually violent 
predators220 
Within 1,000 feet 
of any elementary 
or secondary 
school, day care, 
playground, youth 
center, public 
swimming pool, 
or free standing 
video arcade221 
Life222 No223 
Michigan Persons required 
to register as a 
sex offender224 
Within 1,000 feet 
of school 
property225 
10 years to 
life226 
Yes227 
Mississippi Persons required 
to register as a 
sex offender228 
Within 1,500 feet 
of any elementary 
or secondary 
school or child 
care facility229 
10 years to 
life230 
Yes231 
Missouri Persons convicted 
of certain sex 
offenses232 
Within 1,000 feet 
of any school or 
childcare 
facility233 
Life234 No 
216 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17.495(1) (West 2006) (effective July 12, 2006). 
217 Id.
218 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17.520(2)(a), (3). 
219 Id. Sex offenders who are not required to register for life are automatically released from registration requirements, 
and consequently the residence restriction, after 20 years. 
220 LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:91.1(A)(2) (West 2006) (effective June 28, 2001). 
221 Id. 
222 The statute places no limit on the period of time an offender is subject to the residence prohibition, thus the 
restriction lasts indefinitely. 
223 See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:542.1 (containing no provision for reconsideration of the SVP classification after the 
sentencing court makes the initial determination). Section 2 of Acts 1999, No. 594 repealed paragraph (B)(4) of this 
section which allowed the defendant to petition the sentencing court annually for review of the SVP designation. 
224 MICH. COMP. LAWS § 28.735(1) (2006) (effective Jan. 1, 2006). 
225 MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 28.735(1), 733(f). 
226 MICH. COMP. LAWS § 28.725(6), (7). 
227 Id. Sex offenders who are not required to register for life are automatically released from registration requirements, 
and consequently the residence restriction, after 10 to 25 years. 
228 MISS. CODE ANN. § 45-33-25(4)(a) (2006) (effective July 1, 2006). 
229 Id.
230 MISS. CODE ANN. § 45-33-47(2)(a). 
231 Id. Sex offenders who are not required to register for life may petition a court for release from registration 
requirements after 10 years, and, if successful, will no longer be subject to the residence restriction. 
232 MO. ANN. STAT. § 566.147(1) (West 2006) (effective June 14, 2004). 
233 Id.
234 The statute places no limit on the period of time an offender is subject to the residence prohibition, thus the 
restriction lasts indefinitely. 
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TABLE 1 – SEX OFFENDER RESIDENCE PROHIBITED ZONES 
(CONTINUED) 
 
State Residence 
prohibition 
applies to: 
What is the 
prohibited zone? 
How long is 
an offender 
subject to the 
restriction? 
Possibility 
of release? 
Ohio Persons convicted 
of a sexually 
oriented offense 
or child-victim 
oriented 
offense235 
Within 1,000 feet 
of any school 
premises236 
Life237 No 
Oklahoma Persons registered 
as a sex 
offender238 
Within 2,000 feet 
of any school, 
educational 
institution, park, 
playground, or 
childcare 
facility239 
10 years to 
life240 
Yes241 
South 
Dakota 
Persons required 
to register as a sex 
offender242 
Within 500 feet of 
any school, public 
park, playground, 
or public pool243 
10 years to 
life244 
Yes245 
Tennessee Persons required 
to register as a sex 
offender whose 
victim was a 
minor246 
Within 1,000 feet 
of any school, day 
care/child care 
facility, public 
park, playground, 
recreation center, 
or athletic field247 
10 years to 
life248 
Yes249 
Virginia Adults convicted 
of certain sex 
offenses where 
the offender is 
more than 3 years 
older than the 
victim250 
Within 500 feet of 
the premises of a 
child day center, 
or primary, 
secondary, or high 
school251 
Life252 No 
235 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2950.031(A) (West 2006) (effective July 31, 2003). 
236 Id.
237 The statute places no limit on the period of time an offender is subject to the residence prohibition, thus the 
restriction lasts indefinitely. 
238 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 57, § 590 (West 2006) (effective Nov. 1, 2003). 
239 Id. 
240 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 57, §§ 583(C), 584(J). 
241 Id. Sex offenders who are not required to register for life are automatically released from registration requirements, 
and consequently the residence restriction, after 10 years. 
242 S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-24B-23 (2006) (effective July 1, 2006). 
243 S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 22-24B-23, 22-24B-22(1). 
244 S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 22-24B-27. 
245 Id. A sex offender may petition a court 10 years after conviction for release from the residency restriction. 
246 TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-39-211(a) (2006) (effective June 8, 2004). 
247 Id.
248 TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-39-207(a), (f)(1). 
249 TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-39-207(c). Sex offenders who are not required to register for life may petition the Tennessee 
Bureau of Investigation for release from registration requirements after 10 years, and, if successful, will no longer be 
subject to the residence restriction. 
250 VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-370.3(A) (2006) (effective July 1, 2006). 
251 Id.
252 Id. The offender “shall be forever prohibited from residing” within the prohibited zone. 
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TABLE 2 – PENALTIES FOR RESIDING WITHIN PROHIBITED ZONE 
 
State Felony/Misdemeanor Punishment - 
1st Violation 
Punishment 
-2nd or 
Subsequent 
Violations 
Mental 
Element 
Alabama Class C felony253 Imprisonment, 
1 to 10 
years254 
Same Knowingly255 
Arkansas Class D felony256 Imprisonment, 
up to 6 
years257 
Same Knowingly258 
Delaware Class G felony259 Imprisonment, 
up to 2 
years260 
Same Strict 
Liability261 
Florida First degree 
misdemeanor or third 
degree felony 
depending on the 
degree of punishment 
for the qualifying sex 
offense262 
Misdemeanor, 
imprisonment 
up to 1 year; 
felony, 
imprisonment 
up to 5 
years263 
Same Strict 
Liability264 
Georgia265 Felony Imprisonment, 
10 to 30 years 
Same Knowingly 
Idaho Misdemeanor266 Imprisonment, 
up to 6 
months, fine 
up to $1,000, 
or both267 
Same Strict 
Liability268 
Illinois Class 4 felony269 Imprisonment, 
1 to 3 years270 
Same Knowingly271 
Indiana Class D felony272 Imprisonment, 
6 months to 3 
years, and fine 
not more than 
$10,000273 
Same Knowingly, 
intentionally274 
253 ALA. CODE § 15-20-26(h) (2006). 
254 ALA. CODE § 13A-5-6(a)(3). 
255 ALA. CODE § 15-20-26(h). 
256 ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-14-128(d) (Michie 2006). 
257 ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-401(a)(5). 
258 ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-14-128(d). 
259 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1112(a)(1) (2006). 
260 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4205(b)(7). 
261 The statute contains no culpability requirement, so strict liability is inferred. 
262 FLA. STAT. § 794.065(1) (2006). 
263 FLA. STAT. § 775.082(3)(d), (4)(a). 
264 The statute contains no culpability requirement, so strict liability is inferred. 
265 GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-15(d) (2006). 
266 IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-8329(1) (2006). 
267 IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-113(1). 
268 The statute contains no culpability requirement, so strict liability is inferred. 
269 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-9.3(d) (2006). 
270 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/5-8-1(a)(7). 
271 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-9.3(b-5). 
272 IND. CODE ANN. § 35-42-4-11 (West 2006). 
273 IND. CODE ANN. § 35-50-2-7(a). 
274 IND. CODE ANN. § 35-42-4-11. 
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TABLE 2 – PENALTIES FOR RESIDING WITHIN PROHIBITED ZONE 
(CONTINUED) 
 
State Felony/Misdemeanor Punishment - 
1st Violation 
Punishment -
2nd or 
Subsequent 
Violations 
Mental 
Element 
Iowa Aggravated 
misdemeanor275 
Imprisonment, 
up to 2 years, 
and fine of 
$500 to 
$5,000276 
Same Strict 
Liability277 
Kentucky First violation is a 
Class A misdemeanor. 
Second or subsequent 
violation is a Class D 
felony.278 
Imprisonment, 
up to 1 year279 
Imprisonment, 
1 to 5 years280 
Strict 
Liability281 
Louisiana282 Misdemeanor Imprisonment, 
up to 6 
months, fine 
not to exceed 
$1,000, or 
both 
Same Strict 
Liability283 
Michigan284 First violation is a 
misdemeanor. Second 
or subsequent 
violation is a felony. 
Imprisonment 
up to 1 year, 
$1,000 fine, 
or both 
Imprisonment 
up to 2 years, 
$2,000 fine, 
or both 
Strict 
Liability285 
Mississippi286 Felony Imprisonment 
up to 5 years, 
fine up to 
$5,000, or 
both 
Same Strict 
Liability287 
Missouri First violation is a 
class D felony. 
Second or subsequent 
violation is a class B 
felony.288 
Imprisonment, 
up to 4 
years289 
Imprisonment, 
5 to 15 
years290 
Strict 
Liability291 
275 IOWA CODE ANN. § 692A.2A(3) (West 2006). 
276 IOWA CODE ANN. § 903.1(2). 
277 The statute contains no culpability requirement, so strict liability is inferred. 
278 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17.495(3) (West 2006). 
279 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.090(1). 
280 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.060(2)(d). 
281 The statute contains no culpability requirement, so strict liability is inferred. 
282 LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:91.1(E) (West 2006). 
283 The statute contains no culpability requirement, so strict liability is inferred. 
284 MICH. COMP. LAWS § 28.735(2)(a), (b) (2006). 
285 The statute contains no culpability requirement, so strict liability is inferred. 
286 MISS. CODE ANN. § 45-33-33(2) (2006). 
287 The statute contains no culpability requirement, so strict liability is inferred. 
288 MO. ANN. STAT. § 566.147(4) (West 2006). 
289 MO. ANN. STAT. § 558.011(1). 
290 Id.
291 The statute contains no culpability requirement, so strict liability is inferred. 
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TABLE 2 – PENALTIES FOR RESIDING WITHIN PROHIBITED ZONE 
(CONTINUED) 
 
State Felony/Misdemeanor Punishment - 
1st Violation 
Punishment -
2nd or 
Subsequent 
Violations 
Mental 
Element 
Ohio292 A person who violates 
the prohibition is 
subject to an action 
for injunctive relief 
Injunction Injunction Strict 
Liability293 
Oklahoma294 Misdemeanor Fine not to 
exceed $3,000 
One year in 
county jail in 
addition to the 
fine 
Willfully, 
intentionally 
South 
Dakota 
First violation is a 
class 6 felony; 
subsequent violations 
are class 5 felonies295 
Imprisonment 
for 2 years, or 
fine of 
$4,000, or 
both296 
Imprisonment 
for 5 years. 
Optional fine 
of $10,000.297 
Strict 
Liability298 
Tennessee Class E felony299 Imprisonment, 
1 to 6 years300 
Same Knowingly301 
Virginia Class 6 felony302 Imprisonment, 
1 to 5 years; 
or, jail up to 
12 months 
and fine up to 
$2,500303 
Same Knowingly304 
292 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2950.031(B) (West 2006). 
293 The statute contains no culpability requirement, so strict liability is inferred. 
294 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 57, § 590 (West 2006). 
295 S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-24B-23 (2006). 
296 S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-6-1(9). 
297 S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-6-1(8). 
298 The statute contains no culpability requirement, so strict liability is inferred. 
299 TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-39-211(e) (2006). 
300 TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-35-112. 
301 TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-39-211(a). 
302 VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-370.3(A) (2006). 
303 VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-10(f). 
304 VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-370.3(A). 
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TABLE 3 – SEX OFFENDER EMPLOYMENT RESTRICTIONS 
 
State Employment 
prohibition 
applies to: 
Where is the 
offender 
prohibited from 
working? 
How long is 
an offender 
subject to the 
restriction? 
Possibility 
of release? 
Alabama Persons convicted 
of a “criminal sex 
offense”305 
Within 2,000 feet 
of any school or 
child care 
facility306 
Life307 No 
Alabama Persons convicted 
of a criminal sex 
offense involving 
a child308 
Within 500 feet of 
any school, child 
care facility, park, 
athletic field or 
facility, or other 
business or facility 
having a principal 
purpose of caring 
for, educating, or 
entertaining 
minors309 
Life310 No 
Florida Sexual 
predators311 
At any business, 
school, day care 
center, park, 
playground, or 
other place where 
children regularly 
congregate312 
30 years to 
life313 
Yes314 
Georgia Persons required 
to register as a sex 
offender315 
Within 1,000 feet 
of any child care 
facility, school, or 
church316 
10 years to 
life317 
Yes318 
Georgia Sexually 
dangerous 
predators319 
Within 1,000 feet 
of an area where 
minors 
congregate320 
Life321 No 
305 ALA. CODE §§ 15-20-26(a), 15-20-21(1) (2006). 
306 ALA. CODE § 15-20-26(a). 
307 ALA. CODE § 15-20-33(a). 
308 ALA. CODE §§ 15-20-26(g), 15-20-21(1). 
309 ALA. CODE §§ 15-20-26(g). 
310 ALA. CODE § 15-20-33(a). 
311 FLA. STAT. § 775.21(10)(b) (2006). 
312 Id.
313 FLA. STAT. § 775.21(6)(l). 
314 Id. A sexual predator may petition a court for removal of the sexual predator designation 30 years after release. 
315 GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-15(b)(1) (2006) (effective July 1, 2006). 
316 Id.
317 GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-12(g). 
318 Id. Effective July 1, 2006, sexual offenders may petition a court for release from registration requirements after 10 
years. If successful, the offender will no longer be subject to the employment restriction. 
319 GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-15(b)(2) (effective July 1, 2006). 
320 Id. “Area where minors congregate” includes: public and private parks and recreation facilities, playgrounds, skating 
rinks, neighborhood centers, gymnasiums, school bus stops, and public/community swimming pools. GA. CODE ANN. §
42-1-12(a)(3). 
321 See GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-14 (effective July 1, 2006) (containing no provisions for reconsideration of the “sexually 
dangerous predator” designation after the initial determination is final). 
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TABLE 3 – SEX OFFENDER EMPLOYMENT RESTRICTIONS 
(CONTINUED) 
 
State Employment 
prohibition 
applies to: 
Where is the 
offender 
prohibited from 
working? 
How long is 
an offender 
subject to the 
restriction? 
Possibility 
of release? 
Idaho Persons required 
to register as a sex 
offender322 
At a day care 
center, group day 
care facility, or 
family day care 
home323 
10 years to 
life324 
Yes325 
Indiana Sexually violent 
predators326 
On school 
property, at youth 
program centers, 
or public parks327 
10 years to 
life328 
Yes329 
Michigan Persons required 
to register as a sex 
offender330 
Within 1,000 feet 
of school 
property331 
10 years to 
life332 
Yes333 
Michigan Persons convicted 
of a “listed [sex] 
offense”334 
By a school or 
allowed to work 
under contract in a 
school335 
N/A N/A 
Oklahoma Registered sex 
offenders336 
To work with or 
provide services to 
children or work 
on school 
premises337 
10 years to 
life338 
Yes339 
322 IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-8327(1) (2006). 
323 Id.
324 IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-8310(1). 
325 After 10 years, a sex offender may 1) if not required to register for life, petition a court for release from registration 
requirements, and 2) petition a court for relief from the employment prohibition. IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 18-8310(1), 18-
8328. If successful with either petition, the offender will no longer be subject to the employment restriction. 
326 IND. CODE ANN. § 35-42-4-10(b) (West 2006) (effective July 1, 2006). 
327 Id.
328 IND. CODE ANN. § 35-38-1-7.5(g). 
329 Id. A sexually violent predator may petition a court to have the SVP status removed 10 years after the initial 
classification. 
330 MICH. COMP. LAWS § 28.734(1)(a) (2006). 
331 MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 28.734(1)(a), 28.733(f). 
332 MICH. COMP. LAWS § 28.725(6), (7). 
333 Id. Sex offenders who are not required to register for life are automatically released from registration requirements, 
and consequently the employment restriction, after 10 to 25 years. 
334 MICH. COMP. LAWS § 380.1230a(10). 
335 Id. Interestingly, the statute gives discretion to the school board to approve the hiring of a non-sex felon, but not a 
sex offender. 
336 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 57, § 589(A) (West 2006). 
337 Id.
338 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 57, §§ 583(C), 584(J). 
339 Id. Sex offenders who are not required to register for life are automatically released from registration requirements, 
and consequently the employment restriction, after 10 years. 
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TABLE 3 – SEX OFFENDER EMPLOYMENT RESTRICTIONS 
(CONTINUED) 
 
State Employment 
prohibition 
applies to: 
Where is the 
offender 
prohibited from 
working? 
How long is 
an offender 
subject to the 
restriction? 
Possibility 
of release? 
Tennessee Persons required 
to register as a sex 
offender whose 
victim was a 
minor340 
Within 1,000 feet 
of any school, day 
care/child care 
facility, public 
park, playground, 
recreation center, 
or athletic field341 
10 years to 
life342 
Yes343 
Virginia Adults convicted 
of certain sex 
offenses where 
the offender is 
more than 3 years 
older than the 
victim344 
On public or 
private elementary 
or secondary 
school or child 
day care center 
property345 
Life346 No 
340 TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-39-211(a) (2006). 
341 Id.
342 TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-39-207(a), (f)(1). 
343 TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-39-207(c). Sex offenders who are not required to register for life may petition the Tennessee 
Bureau of Investigation for release from registration requirements after 10 years, and, if successful, will no longer be 
subject to the employment restriction. 
344 VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-370.4(A) (2006) (effective July 1, 2006). 
345 Id.
346 Id. The offender “shall be forever prohibited from working” in the prohibited area. 
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Appendix 1:  http://www.webstercity.com/departments/police_dept/692a.2a_map.asp 
 
